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Finding Law 
Stephen E. Sachs* 
That the judge’s task is to find the law, not to make it, was once a 
commonplace of our legal culture. Today, decades after Erie, the idea 
of a common law discovered by judges is commonly dismissed—as a 
“fallacy,” an “illusion,” a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.” That 
dismissive view is wrong. Expecting judges to find unwritten law is no 
childish fiction of the benighted past, but a real and plausible option 
for a modern legal system. 
This Article seeks to restore the respectability of finding law, in 
part by responding to two criticisms made by Erie and its progeny. The 
first, “positive” criticism is that law has to come from somewhere: 
judges can’t discover norms that no one ever made. But this claim 
blinks reality. We routinely identify and apply social norms that no one 
deliberately made, including norms of fashion, etiquette, or natural 
language. Law is no different. Judges might declare a customary law 
the same way copy editors and dictionary authors declare standard 
English—with a certain kind of reliability, but with no power to revise 
at will. 
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The second, “realist” criticism is that law leaves too many 
questions open: when judges can’t find the law, they have to make it 
instead. But uncertain cases force judges to make decisions, not to 
make law. Different societies can give different roles to precedent (and 
to judges). And judicial decisions can have many different kinds of 
legal force—as law of the circuit, law of the case, and so on—without 
altering the underlying law on which they’re based. 
This Article claims only that it’s plausible for a legal system to 
have its judges find law. It doesn’t try to identify legal systems that 
actually do this in practice. Yet too many discussions of judge-made 
law, including the famous passages in Erie, rest on the false premise 
that judge-made law is inevitable—that judges simply can’t do 
otherwise. In fact, judges can do otherwise: they can act as the law’s 
servants rather than its masters. The fact that they can forces us to 
confront the question of whether they should—and, indeed, whether 
the Erie doctrine itself can outlive its mistaken premises. Finding law 
is no fallacy or illusion; the brooding omnipresence broods on. 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................ 529 
I. Can Judges Find Law? ........................................................................ 532 
A. Finding custom .................................................................... 536 
1. Identifying the custom ................................................... 538 
2. Custom and practice ...................................................... 540 
3. Whose customs count .................................................... 542 
4. How custom can change ................................................ 544 
B. How custom makes law ....................................................... 548 
1. From practice to custom ................................................ 548 
2. From custom to law ....................................................... 550 
3. The nature of unwritten law ........................................... 554 
C. Finding law in practice ........................................................ 557 
II. Must Judges Make Law? .................................................................... 559 
A. Making decisions and making law ....................................... 561 
1. As-if law ........................................................................ 561 
2. Distinguishing law from precedent ................................ 563 
B. Can judges help it? ............................................................... 567 
III. Erie and Finding Law ....................................................................... 570 
A. Legal theory and legal practice ............................................ 571 
B. Erie and state common law .................................................. 573 
C. Erie and “federal common law” .......................................... 577 
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 579 
 
2019] FINDING LAW 529 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Judges ought to remember, that their Office is Jus dicere, and not Jus 
dare; To Interpret Law, and not to Make Law, or Give Law.1 
This Article defends the view that unwritten law can be found, rather than 
made. Suffice it to say that this view is not in vogue. To modern scholars, law is 
always made by somebody: written law is made by legislators, and unwritten law 
is made by judges. The notion “that the common law had a positive source 
independent of judicial decisions” is said to have “no modern adherents.”2 
Maybe Blackstone thought judges were not “to pronounce a new law, but to 
maintain and expound the old one”;3 today “[i]t would be only a slight 
exaggeration to say that there are no more Blackstonians.”4 Some still do assign 
the courts a duty “to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be.”5 Yet 
the late Justice Scalia, who wrote those words, also took unwritten law to be “law 
developed by the judges,” and he viewed “playing common-law judge” as akin 
to “playing king—devising, out of the brilliance of one’s own mind, those laws 
that ought to govern mankind.”6 
Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,7 many judges and academics have 
treated this modern approach as the only conceivable one. To them, Erie not only 
overruled Swift v. Tyson,8 but “overruled a particular way of looking at law.”9 
Erie agreed with Justice Holmes that law “does not exist without some definite 
authority behind it”—and that courts rendering decisions, much like legislatures 
enacting statutes, establish new rules of law in a “voice adopted by the State as 
its own.”10 So Erie left no room for a common law to stand apart from courts or 
legislatures, or to be found instead of made. As one scholar put it, “Erie’s real 
 
 1. FRANCIS BACON, The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall, in 15 THE OXFORD FRANCIS 
BACON 1, 165 (Michael Kiernan ed., 2000) (1625). 
 2. Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative 
Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1999). 
 3. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69; see also Allan Beever, The Declaratory 
Theory of Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 421 (2013) (quoting Blackstone). 
 4. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1759 (1991). 
 5. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 472 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Bacon’s aphorism). 
 6. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 4, 7 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 8. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 9. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). 
 10. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
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significance is that it represents the Supreme Court’s formal declaration that this 
view of the common law . . . is dead, a victim of positivism and realism.”11 
If that’s what Erie declared, then Erie is wrong. A system of positive law, 
with fallible people as judges, can still expect those judges to find unwritten law 
and not to make it. That kind of system is a real possibility, not what John Austin 
called a “childish fiction” of the benighted past.12 Whether any legal systems 
actually work this way is an empirical question, which this Article doesn’t 
address; the claim here is that it’s plausible for a legal system so to arrange 
things. 
In making that claim, this Article adopts a different strategy than other 
recent responses to the modern view. Some scholars contrast judge-made law to 
natural law or to moral principles, rules “out there” that judges might discover.13 
Others distinguish it from bodies of “community custom,”14 like those of 
merchants or sailors, that judges might seek to preserve.15 This Article doesn’t 
contest those theories, but it doesn’t rely on them either. It sets a higher bar by 
focusing on positive law—law that’s “in some important sense a social fact or 
set of social facts”16—and on law that binds society as a whole, not just a single 
tight-knit community. Finding this kind of law is impossible, the modern view 
argues, because there’s nothing out there to find: hence the derision of a 
“‘transcendental body of law outside of any particular State’” as a “fallacy,”17 an 
“illusion,”18 a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”19 Even if law could rest on 
 
 11. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 283 
(1992); see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1409 (2018) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (asserting that, after Erie, “the general common law was no more”); Kermit 
Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1840 (2005) (attributing to Erie the “devastating objection” that “there is 
no such thing”). 
 12. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 655 (Robert Campbell ed., 3d rev. ed. 
1869). 
 13. See, e.g., Beever, supra note 3, at 425–26; Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common 
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 592–93 (Jules 
L. Coleman et al. eds., 2004); cf. Brian Zamulinski, Rehabilitating the Declaratory Theory of the 
Common Law, 2 J.L. & CTS. 171, 171 (2014) (discussing judges’ “ability to apprehend moral truths”). 
 14. Cf. Neil Duxbury, Custom as Law in English Law, 76 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 337, 340 (2017) 
(distinguishing this conception of custom from others). 
 15. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 921, 932–33 (2013); accord Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common 
Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–13 (2015); Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 31 (2013). 
 16. Kent Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism, in 
THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 1, 19 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). 
 17. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & 
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). 
 18. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533. 
 19. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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custom, societies are too diverse to share customs across the board;20 so their 
unwritten law has to come from some other source, like judicial decisions.21 If 
this law isn’t made by legislatures, then it has to be made by judges—for who 
could believe, to use Austin’s phrase, in a “miraculous something made by 
nobody”?22 
What’s strange about this argument, though, is that we follow somethings-
made-by-nobody all the time. People routinely conform their conduct to familiar 
norms of fashion, etiquette, or natural language. These norms are addressed to 
society as a whole, and they’re generally perceived as binding, without anyone 
in authority having formally enacted them or laid them down. Just like legal 
norms, these social norms can sometimes be contested, changeable, 
controversial, political, or morally fraught. Yet in any given society, and at any 
given time, they can also have determinate content, offer broad guidance for the 
future, and stand apart from the style manuals or Miss Manners columns in which 
they’re expressed. If it’s possible for ordinary people to “find etiquette,” then it 
doesn’t seem strange that judges, lawyers, or private citizens might “find law.” 
In that case, the slogan that unwritten law is “whatever judges say it is”23 might 
be true only in the sense that standard English is whatever English teachers, 
dictionary authors, and copy editors say it is—with no copy editor or society of 
copy editors, however influential in practice, having any right to revise it at will. 
Positive law depends on social facts, but the social facts are “out there” for 
diligent jurists to find. 
That leaves a second, realist strain of modern arguments against finding 
law: that courts are inherently lawmaking institutions. Even if there’s some 
unwritten law for judges to find, there’ll never be quite enough. To fill the gaps, 
judges have to make new law: “the process of adjudication necessarily entails 
articulating rules to elaborate and clarify” the law already on the books.24 And if 
making law is inevitable, then Erie got it right: whether a state’s rules “shall be 
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision” is 
only a matter of detail.25 
This Article again sets a higher bar by assuming, for argument’s sake, that 
some legal questions lack a right answer. Judges in unclear cases do have to make 
decisions. But we shouldn’t assume that, in making decisions, they’re also 
making law. A judge’s decision can have different force in different cases or 
 
 20. See Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose 
Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719 (2006). 
 21. See Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 1078 (“Erie . . . recognized that the common law was nothing 
more than those decisions.”). 
 22. 2 AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 655. 
 23. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of 
View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1591 (2006) (criticizing 
Holmes’s view). 
 24. Kramer, supra note 11, at 269. 
 25. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
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different legal systems. And a decision can be influential, or even binding, in 
future cases without ever altering the underlying law. Instead, a system might 
instruct its courts to treat a past decision as if it stated the law, taking that decision 
as the law of the case, the law of the circuit, the dictate of precedent, and so on, 
without taking it to supplant whatever law was there before. The losing party in 
a traffic case might be estopped from later asserting that his light was green, but 
there’s still a fact of the matter; the light was the color it was, whatever future 
judges might have to assume. In the same way, doctrines like precedent or 
preclusion can serve as temporary stand-ins for the actual law, whatever it might 
be—settling certain questions among judges, without necessarily settling them 
right.26 The law is one thing, the decisions of courts another. 
To be clear, this Article won’t defend any number of other views often 
associated—sometimes pejoratively—with a “declaratory theory of law.”27 (Say, 
that judges’ decisions all follow mechanically from precise legal rules, that 
judges are never influenced by policy or politics, that common law doctrines 
have all existed since time immemorial, etc.) Some of these are indeed matters 
of “childish fiction,” and in any case they’re irrelevant to the central point. It’s 
both possible and sensible to task judges with finding the law, though they retain 
their human failings even after donning robes. 
If that’s true, it has real consequences for the American legal system. In 
other countries, the roles of state and federal courts might have little to do with 
legal theory; a federal system can allocate authority how it likes. But Erie’s 
account of American law depends quite heavily on the Court’s most abstract and 
theoretical claims. If law can be found as well as made, then Erie’s strongest 
pillar collapses, and the “Erie doctrine” itself—as to both state law and “federal 
common law”—may collapse as well. 
I. 
CAN JUDGES FIND LAW? 
Judges can only find law if there’s something there to find. The old vision 
of a body of unwritten law, already in place and ready to hand, is now widely 
seen as “a delusion”28 or a “fairy tale[],”29 stemming perhaps from a “self-
deceiving refusal to face the reality of legal decision making.”30 That “judges 
make the common law” is said to be something that “[a]ll lawyers know”31 and 
 
 26. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT (2017). 
 27. See generally Beever, supra note 3 (using this label). 
 28. Lea Brilmayer, Untethered Norms After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: Positivism, 
International Law, and the Return of the “Brooding Omnipresence,” 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 
734 (2013) (criticizing this view). 
 29. Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J. SOC’Y PUB. TEACHERS L. (n.s.) 22, 22 (1972). 
 30. Beever, supra note 3, at 422 (criticizing this view). 
 31. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 175 (2010). 
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that “[e]very beginning law student is taught.”32 Open declarations that “judges 
had made up the common law” appear in the Federal Reporter with little 
comment and no dissent.33 Despite confirmation-hearing claims that judges can 
apply the law as it stands,34 many modern lawyers think otherwise. They assume 
that a state’s unwritten law is “fundamentally like the written law of each state,” 
though “made by a different branch of the state government: written law is made 
by legislatures and unwritten law is made by appellate courts.”35 
On the modern account, unwritten law is nothing but case law: a special 
kind of written law, found in judicial opinions rather than statutes.36 An opinion 
might not read like an enactment, and it might need some interpreting before it 
yields a general rule,37 but in the end the precedent is the source of authority. 
Vacate or reverse the judgment, and the legal rule goes away.38 As Kermit 
Roosevelt puts it, “the positive source of the common law is just the judicial 
decisions in which it is embodied.”39 
This vision of unwritten law is often associated with positivist views of law 
in general. On Abbe Gluck’s account, “the idea of a body of ‘natural,’ general, 
or universal legal principles”—something that judges might find rather than 
make—has given way “to a more positivistic understanding of law as something 
specific,” namely “a policy choice linked to a particular jurisdiction.”40 If that 
policy choice was first recorded in a judicial decision, then it stands to reason 
that the people who made the choice were judges, and that the unwritten law is 
whatever the judges say it is. For scholars like these, “[p]ositivism has 
thoroughly eroded” the notion “of a general law existing independently of any 
 
 32. Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 
111, 115 (2010); cf. Postema, supra note 13, at 588 (criticizing this view). 
 33. Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.). 
 34. See The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2010) (statement of 
Elena Kagan) (stating that “it’s law all the way down”). 
 35. Nelson, Critical Guide, supra note 15, at 930 (criticizing this view); cf. Morris R. Cohen, 
The Process of Judicial Legislation, 48 AM. L. REV. 161, 168 (1914) (“[J]urists and legislators actively 
participate in different ways in the process of law making.”). But see Michael W. McConnell, Tradition 
and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 197 (critiquing the “modernist 
misconception . . . that the common law is simply legislation by judges,” rather than “aris[ing] from 
custom”). 
 36. See generally Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1187 (2007) (describing the evolution of this view). 
 37. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that “there is no single 
method of determining the rule for which a given authoritative precedent is an authority,” although “[t]he 
head-note is usually correct enough”). 
 38. Cf. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) (citing the 
benefits of “[j]udicial precedents” as a reason not to vacate a judgment (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 39. Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 1076; see also Kramer, supra note 11, at 281 (describing “the 
modern understanding of common law as a form of positive law made by judges”); cf. Nelson, 
Legitimacy, supra note 15, at 14 (describing views that treat precedent as the source of common law). 
 40. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie 
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1902 (2011). 
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territorial sovereign”;41 the “positivist view” is simply “that judges ‘make’ new 
law.”42 
Accordingly, a few recent defenses of finding law have begun by 
questioning positivism. Allan Beever, for example, describes past exponents of 
the declaratory theory as arguing that the common law “include[s] the natural 
law.”43 Judges don’t make the natural law, so they might not make the common 
law either. Gerald Postema charts a different path, describing the classical 
conception of the common law as a “process of practical reasoning.”44 Because 
this process looks past the propositions stated in judicial opinions to the 
reasoning that underlies them,45 he sees his view as “incompatible with both 
orthodox natural law thought and with orthodox legal positivism.”46 
These responses, right or wrong, rest on stronger assumptions than 
necessary. Not all positive law is necessarily posited—“set, or 
prescribed, . . . laid down by humans to humans,”47 in the form of explicit 
“statutes [or] court decisions.”48 Positive law might just be like other normative 
systems, such as grammar, etiquette, or fashion, which are solidly rooted in 
social facts without having been formally adopted by anyone. No one disparages 
natural language as a “miraculous something made by nobody.”49 And to borrow 
H.L.A. Hart’s phrase, it’d be “merely dogmatic”—indeed, rather absurd—to say 
that nothing can be a rule of grammar “unless and until it has been ordered by 
someone to be so.”50 
Other defenses of finding law focus on preserving popular custom. For 
example, if merchants traditionally allow each other three “days of grace” before 
payment, the law might take the custom of that community into account when 
resolving disputes.51 Legal officials might then look to “the usual or ordinary 
 
 41. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 780 
(2010). 
 42. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 4, at 1760; accord Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist 
Interpretation and the Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 10 n.47 (2017) 
(describing Justice Brandeis’s position in Erie as “the now prevalent positivist view”). 
 43. Beever, supra note 3, at 425–26. 
 44. Postema, supra note 13, at 601. 
 45. Id. (arguing that a judge can’t “unilaterally and finally fix the scope or meaning of a rule 
through his or her decision, regardless of how carefully crafted the language of the opinion is,” because 
“the quality and force of the reasoning, not the public utterance of it . . . lends authority to a court’s 
rationale”). 
 46. Id. at 599. 
 47. A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL 
HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 359, 362 (1987) (criticizing this view). 
 48. Beever, supra note 3, at 425. 
 49. 2 AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 655. 
 50. HART, supra note 37, at 46–47 (emphasis omitted). 
 51. See Nelson, Legitimacy, supra note 15, at 11. 
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understandings of parties to a commercial transaction,”52 or what the Uniform 
Commercial Code calls the “usages of trade,”53 as something “out there” to find. 
These defenses, too, are more limited than they need to be. A society can 
have a customary rule without many members of that society needing to take part 
in the custom. Plenty of nonlegal social conventions are highly obscure in 
practice, like the forms of address for various dignitaries or the “popular names” 
of minor constellations. But they’re still bona fide social conventions, matters of 
widespread agreement among those widely believed to know such things. In the 
same way, the doctrine of anticipatory breach or the rule against perpetuities 
might be known primarily to an elite group of legal experts, yet still be part of a 
customary law that belongs to society as a whole.54 Judges bound to apply that 
law might then be expected to apply these prevailing standards without 
alteration: to find the rules, and not to make them. 
Finding these prevailing rules may not be easy. There are difficult questions 
of judgment in extracting a particular customary rule from a diverse society, in 
tracking changes in a custom over time, and so on. But in contexts other than 
law, few would call these tasks impossible or incoherent. People who can’t 
explain how prevailing norms are grounded on complex social facts can still tell 
you whether a given outfit would be out of place at an important business 
meeting, or whether an ordinary English phrase would be ruled out-of-bounds in 
English class. When it comes to fashion, etiquette, or grammar, we routinely 
distinguish everyday practice from the prevailing standard, usually without 
thinking. 
And while these kinds of social norms may seem fuzzy or indistinct, at least 
compared to the extraordinary technical detail of modern legal systems, there’s 
nothing mysterious about law resembling or resting on social norms like these. 
On what Mitchell Berman calls the standard positivist picture, societies can 
produce any number of “independent artificial normative systems,” of which law 
is a wholly “non-exceptional” example.55 We regularly distinguish what’s 
customary from what just happens (the “done thing” from what’s frequently 
done), or separate “hard” customary obligations from “soft” ones (say, bad 
grammar from bad writing). We can equally well distinguish legally binding 
norms from the informal social customs of a legal elite, drawing a line between 
 
 52. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1791 (1997); see Duxbury, supra note 14, at 340; cf. Stephen E. Sachs, From 
St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 685 (2006) (cautioning against hasty attributions of mercantile law to mercantile practice). 
 53. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“A ‘usage of trade’ is 
any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as 
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”). 
 54. See SIMPSON, supra note 47, at 374. 
 55. Mitchell N. Berman, Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems, in DIMENSIONS OF 
NORMATIVITY: NEW ESSAYS ON METAETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE 137, 138-39 (D. Plunkett et al. 
eds., 2019). 
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intestate succession and judges’ wearing black robes. Whatever faculty helps us 
sort out one custom from another can help us sort out law from custom. And just 
as we sometimes find it useful to designate particular people to apply our 
customary standards—say, the grader of a college entrance exam, or the amateur 
referee of a pickup basketball game—we might appoint particular officials to 
apply standards that are already taken as legally obligatory. A rule of customary 
law doesn’t have to wait for a judge’s ruling to make it so, any more than a rule 
in a pickup game waits around to be born when a referee first applies it. 
Theories of positive law don’t always agree. But it’s far from clear that 
anything in the nature of law would prevent us from finding it. If anything, 
there’s good reason to think that unwritten law is regularly found in practice. 
Indeed, without it, courts couldn’t make many familiar types of decisions, 
including the federal “Erie guess” about the content of state law.56 That should 
make us appropriately skeptical of Erie-based arguments against finding law: if 
judge-found law didn’t exist, Erie would have us invent it. 
A. Finding custom 
We live in a world chock-full of social rules. How we dress, how we act, 
how we write: all these are governed, not merely by practice or rote habit, but by 
shared standards of assessment and criticism. These shared standards are more 
than just coincidences of judgment or taste. Many of them are social objects—
norms that we identify, accept, and apply together—and they profoundly shape 
our everyday lives, without any authoritative procedure to enact them or give 
them force. 
In the legal world, though, the idea of an authoritative procedure dies hard. 
The way we identify rules of grammar or etiquette seems too wishy-washy to be 
useful for identifying rules of law. To Mark Greenberg, for example, “[t]elling 
lawyers to look to customs . . . doesn’t take us very far,” at least not without 
answers to some very basic questions: “Which customs matter? Do customs of 
ordinary people count for anything? Of ordinary lawyers or only certain elite 
lawyers?”57 For that matter, how do unwritten rules ever change, unless someone 
changes them? And how can judges declare this changing practice, without 
deciding the answers themselves? These questions are sharp ones, and they’re 
made sharper by a legal system that demands hard-and-fast answers—under 
pressure from talented advocates—to what might otherwise be questions of 
degree. 
At the same time, though, the questions are hardly unanswerable. Most 
people might agree that the law can incorporate ordinary popular customs: say, 
providing by statute that “a single hand of five-card draw poker” will be used to 
 
 56. See, e.g., Temple v. McCall, 720 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Mark Greenberg, What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards 
vs. Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 105, 122 (2017). 
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break ties in local elections.58 If the parties later dispute whether three of a kind 
beats two pair, they won’t be disagreeing about what the statute means, but what 
the rules of poker actually are—rules that no one ever laid down or enacted. As 
a matter of procedure, these disputes might end up being answered by various 
judges or election officials. But it’s still the external social practice, and not some 
official decision, that makes the answers right or wrong. (The statute says 
“poker,” not “poker, as it subsequently may be defined by judges and election 
officials.”) 
If customary rules like these can exist and be given legal force, then the 
same might be true of other customary rules specific to the legal system. A statute 
or procedural rule might invoke the traditional set of remedies in equity,59 the 
traditional grounds for awarding new trials,60 or the traditional rules for the 
issuance of writs,61 in the same way that it might invoke a traditional ranking of 
poker hands. Or it might incorporate an entire body of traditional rules 
wholesale—such as by declaring “the common law of England” to be “in full 
force” in Virginia.62 
Whether traditional rules can have legal force on their own, or whether they 
first need the blessing of a statute or sovereign pronouncement, is discussed 
below.63 But despite the many questions surrounding customary law—what it is, 
how it arises, who it belongs to, how it changes, and so on—it seems entirely 
plausible that a legal system might include customary rules like these. Or, at 
least, this seems no less plausible than the idea that poker players can reliably 
identify and apply the rules of poker. In other contexts, for other systems of 
customary norms, we manage to solve these problems every day. And if these 
problems are surmountable in other areas of life, then maybe they should trouble 
us less with respect to law. 
 
 58. See Quick Game of Poker Settles New Mexico Mayor Contest, REUTERS NEWS, Mar. 6, 
1998 (discussing a similar episode). 
 59. See, e.g., CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 439 (2011) (interpreting a statutory 
entitlement to “appropriate equitable relief” to include “those categories of relief that, traditionally 
speaking[,] . . . were typically available in equity” (citations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A) (permitting new jury trials “for any reason for which a new 
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court”). 
 61. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (empowering courts of the United 
States to issue “all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the 
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law”) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012)). 
 62. An Ordinance to Enable the Present Magistrates and Officers to Continue the 
Administration of Justice, ch. 5, § 6 (Va. 1776), in A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH PUBLIC ACTS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND ORDINANCES OF THE CONVENTIONS OF VIRGINIA, PASSED SINCE THE 
YEAR 1768, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 37, 37 (Richmond, Thomas Nicholson & William Prentis 1785) 
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 1-200) (emphasis omitted). 
 63. See infra Part I.B. 
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1. Identifying the custom 
To find unwritten law, we have to know where to look. “Written” law might 
be unclear, but it’s no mystery: the statute says what’s in the statute book, and 
it’s law because the legislator said so. But “unwritten” law has an air of obscurity. 
If there’s nothing authoritative for us to read, then what’s the law, and where 
does it come from? 
The mystery is made worse by Blackstone’s ecstatic descriptions of the 
common law—as “the universal rule of the whole kingdom,”64 discerned by 
judges as “depositaries of the laws” and “living oracles,”65 who “do not pretend 
to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.”66 
There’s a strong temptation to view these as fairy tales, or even as deceit: a con 
job by judges, who never really set their “own private judgment” aside when 
declaring “the known laws and customs of the land.”67 Hence the critics’ 
mockery of the “transcendental body of law,” the “mysterious something made 
by nobody,” and so on. 
But the mystery dissolves once we remember how good we are at 
identifying unwritten rules. Language, fashion, etiquette, and other customary 
systems are all unwritten in this way. A rule of standard English might not be 
“the universal rule of the whole kingdom,” but it’s close: with surprising 
consistency, we spell words correctly, compose full sentences, follow shared 
norms of grammar and word order,68 and so on. What’s more, we do this without 
any authoritative list of social rules analogous to the Statutes at Large. A social 
norm can be taught and transmitted through writings (textbooks, fashion 
magazines, Dear Abby columns, and so on), without being founded on these 
writings; no grammar book establishes rules of English in “the way that statute 
books establish rules of law.”69 
What makes these rules “unwritten” isn’t whether they can be expressed in 
words—they can—but why the words matter. A statute would still be “written” 
if it were “a string of ones and zeros in ASCII format,” or “a set of interpretive 
dance steps,” or even “if we all just memorized it, taught it to our children, and 
then burned the National Archives.”70 It would “still contain particular terms, 
adopted on a particular occasion, that carry legal significance by virtue of their 
adoption.”71 Rules of grammar or etiquette, by contrast, don’t have to be adopted 
in any particular way; they’re not enacted through some procedure with 
 
 64. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at *67. 
 65. Id. at *69. 
 66. Id. at *70. 
 67. Id. at *69. 
 68. Cf. MARK FORSYTH, THE ELEMENTS OF ELOQUENCE: SECRETS OF THE PERFECT TURN 
OF PHRASE 45–46 (2014) (noting that size adjectives are placed before color, such that “great green 
dragons” will scan but “green great dragons” won’t). 
 69. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 160 (2017). 
 70. Id. at 159. 
 71. Id. 
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validating effect, as prescribed by yet another set of rules (what Hart called 
“secondary” rules).72 Instead, grammar and etiquette rules typically rest on a 
general practice that different people can describe differently, with any standard 
formulations (like “i before e, except after c”) useful only insofar as they get the 
practice right.73 The authorities in these fields are epistemic ones, “living 
oracles” and “depositaries” of practice like Ann Landers, your third-grade 
teacher, or Strunk & White.74 Their job is to report the “customs of the land” 
without “pretend[ing] to make a new [rule],”75 just as almanacs report the tide 
schedule without pretending to command the tides. 
Unwritten law can work the same way. Brian Simpson saw “[f]ormulations 
of the common law” as resembling “grammarians’ rules, which both describe 
linguistic practices and attempt to systematize and order them.”76 The rules 
discussed by Blackstone—say, that “there shall be four superior courts of record, 
the chancery, the king’s bench, the common pleas, and the exchequer”; that 
“wills shall be construed more favourably, and deeds more strictly”; that “money 
lent upon bond is recoverable by action of debt”;77 or that the crime of burglary 
“must be by night”78—are all written down in his book, but they aren’t founded 
on any particular writings. They’re just things that competent lawyers were 
supposed to know. Even today, without any statute to tell us so, we know that 
duress is a defense to certain crimes, that the defendant has the burden of proving 
it, and so on; a judicial decision might illustrate the rule,79 but the rule long 
predates the decision. 
Because these rules are unwritten, they don’t always need to be expressed 
in particular terms, so long as there’s agreement on their content. Six torts 
professors might give six different explanations of res ipsa loquitur;80 if they’re 
similar enough to “secure general agreement,”81 that’s all that matters. Some 
unwritten rules do have a classic formulation, like John Chipman Gray’s version 
of the rule against perpetuities (that “[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if 
at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of 
the interest”).82 What makes the formulation classic isn’t some special legal 
power vested in John Chipman Gray, but the successful reception and use of his 
formulation by subsequent generations of law students—just as the standard 
 
 72. See HART, supra note 37, at 94–99 (distinguishing “secondary” rules-about-rules from 
“primary” rules of obligation). 
 73. Sachs, supra note 69, at 160. 
 74. See WILLIAM STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (3d ed. 1979). 
 75. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at *69–70. 
 76. SIMPSON, supra note 47, at 376. 
 77. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at *68. 
 78. 4 id. at *224. 
 79. E.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6, 8 (2006). 
 80. See SIMPSON, supra note 47, at 372. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 174 (3d ed. 
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lyrics to “Jingle Bells, Batman Smells” are determined by playground practice, 
and not their attribution to some long-lost author. The formulation is meant to 
summarize an existing practice, and it’s only good law to the extent that it’s a 
good summary. 
So we might well identify unwritten legal rules largely as Blackstone did: 
by their “long and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception.”83 The 
adjectives have to be taken with a grain of salt. Neither grammar rules nor Gray’s 
formulation have really been used always and everywhere. Yet they may still 
reflect the practice here and now. What’s important is that the relevant norm is 
drawn from current practice; it isn’t dependent on some special authorizing event 
for its “original institution and authority,” the way that “acts of parliament are.”84 
2. Custom and practice 
Custom is said to arise from current practice and also to create rules for the 
future. How do we get from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought’? If milkmen were to regularly 
“adulterate the milk supplied to their customers,”85 Dickinson asked, would that 
create a custom of milkmen—or even a customary law? Maybe, as Jeremy 
Bentham wrote, “a law is to be extracted [from the cases] by every man who can 
fancy that he is able: by each man, perhaps a different law.”86 
To solve this problem, customary law has long been said to demand two 
things: that there be a widespread practice, and that the practice be followed from 
a sense of obligation (opinio juris).87 This definition strikes some as circular, 
even “mysterious”: “the legal obligation is created by a . . . belief in the existence 
of the legal obligation.”88 So critics have offered various other explanations for 
these practices—for example, that the actors are motivated by self-interest 
instead.89 
For practices of language or etiquette, though, opinio juris makes a lot of 
sense—and seems in accord with recent research on social norms.90 A speaker 
who conjugates her verbs doesn’t have to be motivated by a love of conjugation 
 
 83. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at *64. 
 84. Id. 
 85. John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 113, 131 (1929). 
 86. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 192 (H.L.A. Hart ed., Univ. of London: 
Athlone Press 1970) (1782). 
 87. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
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(2005). 
 89. Id. at 26. 
 90. See, e.g., CRISTINA BICCHIERI, NORMS IN THE WILD: HOW TO DIAGNOSE, MEASURE, AND 
CHANGE SOCIAL NORMS 35 (2016) (defining a social norm as “a rule of behavior such that individuals 
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or of rule-following; she might have perfectly ordinary and self-interested 
reasons, such as wishing to seem well-educated or to be understood.91 Still, she’s 
acting in full compliance with the rule, and if questioned she might cite the rule 
to explain or justify what she did. As Hart explains, we don’t need to delve into 
psychology to explain why “chess-players will move the bishop diagonally,”92 
so long as the rules matter in guiding, explaining, and justifying what they do.93 
Opinio juris reflects whether they take a putative social rule as a rule, 
distinguishing “the adult chess-player’s move from the action of the baby who 
merely pushed the piece into the right place.”94 (As Leslie Green notes, the most 
powerful rules are the ones we obey without even thinking: “Few men wake up 
in the morning, mentally rehearse the gender-rules about dress, and then put on 
trousers instead of a skirt in a deliberate attempt to conform to that norm.”95) 
So practice-plus-obligation fits our norms rather well. What counts as 
standard English may vary over time,96 but it’s not just a corpus-linguistics 
catalog of whatever words people happen to use. Instead, it’s a normative 
practice—a practice of following a particular set of social rules, complete with 
do’s and don’t’s, accepted standards of behavior and shared grounds for 
criticism. The longstanding battle between “descriptivists” and “prescriptivists” 
overlooks the fact that we always act in both roles at once: we can describe our 
system only in terms of the prescriptive norms in current use.97 Whatever our 
statistics on word usage (“Fifty-two percent of respondents approve of the 
singular ‘they’”), there might be no magic threshold that suddenly counts as 
general acceptance, just as there’s no magic number of sand grains that suddenly 
count as a heap. Still, we understand that some usages are generally permitted in 
our language while others are not. Someone grading the Advanced Placement 
English Language and Composition exam has to decide what counts as a “lapse[] 
in diction or syntax,”98 something that’s unintelligible absent a shared 
understanding of standard English as ruling some usages in and others out.99 
 
 91. See Mark Greenberg, How to Explain Things with Force, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1932, 1962 
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All this can also be true of law. Just as English-speakers don’t have to like 
formal English, and just as store clerks don’t have to believe that “the customer 
is always right,”100 law-abiding citizens don’t have to be motivated by their 
admiration for various rules of law. They only need, when the point is raised, to 
understand the customary rules as rules, and not just as things that lots of people 
do. 
3. Whose customs count 
To identify a rule from social practice, we need to know whose practice 
matters. Sometimes customary law draws on the practice of a regulated 
community, like that of merchants,101 ranchers,102 or nation-states103—distinct 
communities whose informal norms might be absorbed into the formal law.104 
To critics of this model, including the early twentieth-century scholar John 
Dickinson, such a “customary theory of law breaks down in a complex 
society.”105 For the legal system as a whole, “practically no legally pertinent 
customs are universal, but nearly all are partial, fluid, conflicting.”106 Matt Adler 
similarly contends that the modern world is too diverse, its social norms too 
specific to individual groups, for there to be shared norms that define the law.107 
To Adler, there’s no single community that defines dress norms for all of 
Manhattan, and perhaps no single community that defines legal norms for the 
entire United States.108 
Social practice is very diverse. But for nonlegal norms, there’s often one 
practice that dominates the others, for better or for worse—and we often have no 
trouble identifying it. No matter how varied the fashions on the Manhattan 
subway, in a lineup most people could pick out those dressed “professionally.” 
And no matter how polyglot the city of New York, we can still distinguish (in 
John Fisher’s words) between the “formal, official language in which business 
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is carried on” and “the various casual dialects of familiar exchange.”109 People 
who rarely use standard American English can still identify it as the standard—
or at least can identify the elite practitioners whose opinions set the standard. 
Nothing about this process need be democratic, or even all that fair, for it to be 
a distinctive feature of a society.110 
The same thing happens in law. What’s customary for ordinary people, the 
custom in pays (“in the country”), coexists with a more specific custom in foro 
(“in the court”)—in Simpson’s terms, a “body of traditional ideas received 
within a caste of experts.”111 It’d be silly to treat the rule against perpetuities as 
a popular custom, like eating with knife and fork; but it makes perfect sense to 
place it among the internal customary practices of a legal elite.112 As Joseph 
Beale saw, unwritten law reflects the “body of principles which is accepted by 
the legal profession”—shaped by the “teachers of law,” the “expressed opinion 
of writers,” and “the argument of practicing lawyers.”113 The relevant customs 
are those of jurists, or of the expert legal class. 
Because these are our jurists, there’s also a clear sense in which custom in 
foro belongs to society as a whole. We often rely on what Hilary Putnam called 
a “division of linguistic labor”: people with no idea how elm trees differ from 
beech trees can still talk about them as separate kinds of trees, trusting that expert 
botanists will know the difference.114 We equally rely on lawyers or grammar 
snoots to know their field’s rules and to tell us what they are. (And these groups, 
too, sometimes contract out to a smaller class of specialists—say, admiralty or 
tax lawyers, whose views on admiralty or tax law are taken as those of the legal 
profession as a whole.) What makes standard English “standard” is precisely this 
sort of incorporation-by-reference: it’s enforced as everyone’s “good grammar,” 
not just as the dialect of one cloistered group. The same process can turn the legal 
customs of elites into the legal customs of society at large. So long as we can 
pick out the experts, and the experts can pick out the rules, the rules still belong 
to us all. 
(Again, this is true whether or not the process is all that democratic or fair. 
The rules belong to “us,” not in the sense that we ourselves would choose them—
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they might be terrible—but in the sense that they happen to be the rules of the 
society in which we live. That society, to borrow Hart’s phrasing, “might be 
deplorably sheeplike; the sheep might end in the slaughter-house. But there is 
little reason for thinking that [such rules] could not exist,” or alternatively for 
“denying [them] the title of a legal system.”115) 
For some legal rules, the “us” extends quite far. Judges once claimed to 
find, not just the common law of New York or South Carolina, but the common 
law: something that transcended particular jurisdictions while deciding real cases 
within them. That kind of law might seem hard to base on social facts, and easy 
to mock as a “brooding omnipresence”—until we remember that customs aren’t 
confined by political boundaries, and that they can be shared across borders and 
across cultures, too. Whatever the linguistic differences from Manhattan to 
Myrtle Beach, English teachers across the map generally aim at enforcing shared 
standards, making it strange to deny (per Justice Holmes) “that there is this 
outside thing to be found.”116 And just as American and British English are 
variations of a transatlantic language (indeed, a global one), the common law 
applied in New York might be mostly the same as that applied in Charleston or 
London, with all three jurisdictions drawing from a single transatlantic well. In 
Beale’s day, courts often used the term “common law” without indicating which 
kind they meant;117 but this loose talk is no more unusual than saying that 
Americans speak “English,” without mentioning the many other languages 
spoken here or the many kinds of English spoken elsewhere in the world. If it’s 
the local custom of the jurisdiction to apply a more general customary rule—
supplemented, perhaps, by other local variations or local usages118—then there’s 
nothing mysterious about this general custom being “outside of any particular 
State but obligatory within it.”119 
4. How custom can change 
Finding custom is one thing; accounting for change is another. “If judges 
never make any laws,” an American realist once asked, “how could the body of 
rules known as the common law ever have arisen, or have undergone the changes 
which it has?”120 On the one hand, it’d be silly to claim that the common law 
“exist[s] . . . from eternity,”121 as Austin mockingly suggested—or, to quote a 
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1910 doggerel, “[t]hat there prevailed in Babylon / [t]he law of motor cars.”122 
On the other hand, accepting changes in the common law might mean accepting 
that judges change it, amending the law every time they overrule a prior case.123 
This dilemma resembles what international lawyers call the “chronological 
paradox”: how could a custom possibly get started? If custom is practice-plus-
obligation, the very first person to engage in a practice couldn’t have been 
required to do it by custom. Yet if she didn’t act from customary obligation, then 
her practice couldn’t have established a custom to obligate the second person, 
and so on.124 One response to the paradox is to deny that any custom exists; the 
other is to have the courts impose it themselves, as “a binding norm going 
forward” that’s “socially and morally desirable.”125 For any common law rule, 
the Supreme Court reasoned in 1907, “there must . . . be a first statement,” which 
will be “found in the decisions of the courts,” and which “presents the principle 
as certainly as the last.”126 
As applied to nonlegal norms, though, the “paradox” loses its bite. The first 
person to wear a skinny tie in 1950s America didn’t respond to what was already 
the fashion; nevertheless, at some point, some other people did. The same goes 
for changes in accepted spelling—say, from Chaucer’s time to Shakespeare’s to 
today.127 Maybe the first American to drop the ‘u’ from ‘behaviour’ 
misunderstood the custom; or maybe it was just a printer’s error, or a deliberate 
attempt at subversion on the part of Noah Webster.128 Eventually, the new 
spelling caught on, and then became de rigueur. Likewise, the “early adopters” 
of a standard might have been mistaken about its popularity, or perhaps they 
deliberately set out to enforce a new rule; but none of that matters to the strength 
of the custom today. Neither an English teacher nor a person getting dressed in 
the morning needs to resolve any philosophical problems before they can follow 
the current practice. 
Because it’s founded on practice, a custom can change without anyone 
needing authority to change it.129 No one has to issue a decree on tie width for 
the fashion to evolve over time. It just does, as people haphazardly revise their 
 
 122. Harry R. Blythe, A Theory, 22 GREEN BAG 193, 193 (1910); cf. 1 BEALE, supra note 113, 
§ 4.7, at 39 (“[B]y a process of backward projection, it is argued that unless the courts changed the law 
the law must have been the same in 1200 that it is today.”). 
 123. See Dickinson, supra note 85, at 119. 
 124. See Kadens, supra note 104, at 15; Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law 
Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE, supra note 104, at 34, 40. 
 125. Bradley, supra note 124, at 56. 
 126. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 96–97 (1907). 
 127. Cf. Fallon, supra note 96, at 1119 (noting linguistic changes over time). 
 128. See DAVID MICKLETHWAIT, NOAH WEBSTER AND THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY 148–49 
(2000); cf. Johnson, The Error of Our Ways, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2019, at 81 (describing how “a 
napron” later became “an apron”). 
 129. See John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Book Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVS. (Dec. 
8, 2011), https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/legality [https://perma.cc/AH6W-XTEV] (reviewing Scott J. 
Shapiro, LEGALITY (2011)) (discussing the “chicken and egg problem”). 
546 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:527 
beliefs and actions. If Vogue editor Anna Wintour declared that skinny ties were 
“in,” she’d at best be trying to hasten this change in practice—to “make ‘fetch’ 
happen,”130 so to speak. Given her position, she might be successful.131 But a 
causal power to influence others isn’t the same as a norm-conferred authority to 
legislate. Wintour might persuade others, or she might not; but there’s no 
preexisting social rule authorizing the editor of Vogue to establish new rules of 
tie width at will. 
At this point, the legal analogy should be clear. Unwritten law certainly 
changes over time, as a function of changes in how lawyers and officials 
understand the law.132 Courts are especially well-equipped to bring about these 
changes, even when their opinions aren’t binding—as was the case for many 
prominent district court opinions.133 But this, again, is a causal and not a legal 
power. George W. Bush and Will Ferrell between them managed to get 
“strategery” into the Oxford English Dictionary,134 but no one lists this among 
the powers vested in the President by Article II. 
To criticize these changes for their lack of authority, as Dickinson did,135 is 
to recite the chronological paradox again. Unlike written law, custom doesn’t 
need to be enacted. Once enough of the right people drop the ‘u’ from 
‘behaviour,’ or treat parol contracts as requiring consideration, a good dictionary 
editor or legal treatise writer is obliged to recognize the new standard. Tracing 
the exact development of the change over time would be burdensome and 
pointless; it even bored Blackstone, who found nothing “more difficult than to 
ascertain the precise beginning and first spring of an antient and long-established 
custom.”136 
In fact, worrying too much about the origins of a particular rule is a 
symptom of ignoring the distinctions between written and unwritten law. Rules 
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of written law trace their validity to an initial enactment, made by particular 
people in a particular way; as Simpson writes, a statute “is both the only reason 
and a conclusive reason for saying that this is the law.”137 This may be the normal 
way of thinking about American constitutional law, which gives pride of place 
to written sources.138 But unwritten law, like a natural language, derives its 
content from usage today, not from whatever happened a long time ago. It simply 
doesn’t matter which obscure case, “decided say in 1540,” was the first to hold 
“that parol contracts require consideration”;139 the rule doesn’t “derive[] its 
status as law today from this antique decision,” and the old decision wouldn’t 
even be “good authority for the rule” in a modern brief.140 Nor does it matter 
whether today’s law of choses-in-action started with some shenanigans pulled 
by Lord Mansfield in the eighteenth century.141 The existing doctrine might have 
been “judge-made” in some causal sense, but it’d be deeply misleading to view 
that doctrine as “the product of a series of acts of legislation” by unremembered 
judges.142 Its current validity rests on current acceptance; Lord Mansfield has 
nothing to do with it. 
Living with past judicial shenanigans doesn’t mean giving carte blanche to 
future ones. At any given time, officials are obliged to conform to the law as it 
stands.143 Past changes in law don’t offer legal ground for new departures, any 
more than past changes in spelling license each English teacher to invent some 
more. Dickinson criticized “the paradoxical conservatism . . . of the historical 
jurist, which holds that because law has continually changed in the past it is 
somehow impossible to change it in the present.”144 But changing the law plainly 
isn’t impossible; it might just be forbidden by other rules of law.145 A legal 
system can coherently give legislative power only to certain officials (like 
legislators), while expecting other officials (like policemen or judges) merely to 
apply that law, whatever it is and wherever it came from. The fact of change over 
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time doesn’t mean that there’s no legal standard to apply right now; and if there 
weren’t any standard to apply right now, we couldn’t talk coherently about 
change over time. 
B. How custom makes law 
Analogizing law to social rules is only the first step: we still have to decide 
which social rules really are rules of law. As Mark Greenberg argues, the same 
facts can be used to support many different and conflicting norms.146 So which 
facts produce legal norms, and which norms do they produce? Whatever norms 
we pick might seem a deliberate choice of the judges, not the result of some 
dispassionate process of discovery. And if law is something wielded by real 
officials, rather than just brooding omnipresently in the sky, then perhaps (the 
modern argument goes) it’s the officials who get to make the law. 
In fact, ordinary custom can do plenty of work on its own, without first 
needing an official pronouncement to transform it into law. Facts about social 
practice might be consistent with multiple legal rules, but that’s true of all 
customary rules; we should be wary of any argument that’d make it impossible 
to identify custom at all. Similarly, ordinary customary rules can share all the 
hallmarks of legal rules—establishing complex hierarchies of rules, empowering 
officials, addressing topics of great moral weight, and so on. If we can reliably 
identify distinct bodies of custom, then we can also identify a distinct body of 
legal rules, even before the judges get their hands on it. And it seems unlikely 
that only written sources (like statutes or judicial decrees) can give rules their 
legal status, for then we’d have to ask what makes those written sources count.147 
A system that relies on unwritten rules for recognizing particular pieces of paper 
as “statutes” or “constitutions” can just as easily recognize particular customary 
rules as “rules of common law.” Maybe something in the nature of law requires 
custom to be blessed by judges before it can serve as part of the law; but that 
claim is highly controversial, and there may not be much reason to believe that 
it’s true. 
1. From practice to custom 
Whatever our social practices might be, Mark Greenberg argues, in theory 
they could reflect any number of social rules.148 Just as dots can be connected by 
an infinite number of curves, a given set of cases might establish any number of 
“lines” of case law, if we use “a non-standard or ‘bent’ model” to read them.149 
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For example, how can we be sure that the doctrine of quasi-contract doesn’t lapse 
on December 31, 2049? That kind of “bent” rule seems like “a non-starter”;150 
but how can we rule it out, if all of the cases on quasi-contract are from before 
2050? Everything the legal system has done to date—including every discussion 
of quasi-contract in a law school classroom, and so on—occurred well before 
2050, and so is equally consistent with both rules. 
To Greenberg, if all we have is social practice, then it’s not clear what keeps 
these “bent” rules out. A bunch of data points on a page won’t spontaneously fit 
themselves to a line; we have to do that ourselves, and that means making 
choices. Something has to limit which aspects of a practice are or aren’t legally 
relevant (say, “occurring before 2050”);151 but those limits can’t be supplied by 
the law, as ‘the law’ is precisely what we’re trying to discover.152 We might just 
take those limits as brute facts, but that doesn’t seem right either; there ought to 
be intelligible reasons why people’s actions and beliefs have the legal 
consequences they do.153 Yet if we look only to facts about practice, it’s not clear 
what those reasons are. 
This is a powerful argument, but maybe it’s too powerful. As Greenberg 
recognizes, it isn’t “limited to the law”; it follows the same structure as other 
well-known problems of language and induction,154 and it applies just as much 
to other social rules. (Do chess bishops move diagonally only before 2050? If 
not, why not?155) Without reviewing other possible answers to these puzzles,156 
it’s enough to note that, if the problems have the same structure, then they ought 
to be handled with the same solutions. If practice generates real social norms for 
chess, then maybe it can do the same for quasi-contract. 
In fact, it may be crucial to Greenberg’s theory that the general problem be 
solvable. He would rule out “bent” interpretations with “value facts,” which 
privilege certain ways of inferring obligations from practice.157 A statute’s legal 
content might rest in part on ordinary linguistic usage, because that’s evidence 
of what Congress intended or how the provision is reasonably understood, and 
those things matter for reasons of democracy or fairness.158 A new ordinance that 
“cars must drive on the right” might affect our obligations by changing how other 
people are likely to act, which matters for other things we value (like preventing 
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accidents).159 But to conclude that there is such a thing as ordinary linguistic 
usage—or that we have a social norm of driving on the right, that others reading 
this statute are likely to keep doing so, and so on—we have to extract general 
rules from past practice. Simply to apply the value facts correctly, we need to 
rule out in advance certain “bent” interpretations of our linguistic or social 
practices (say, “use ‘right’ and ‘left’ in the traditional way only until this 
afternoon, then flip”). And whatever method Greenberg uses to rule those out, 
anyone else can use too. Customary law, like other kinds of custom, can be 
rooted in practice even if we can’t spell out the precise relation between the two. 
It can be intelligible enough for our purposes, without needing to be intelligible 
all the way down. 
2. From custom to law 
Language, etiquette, and fashion are all systems of social norms. Is law 
different in kind? Drawing analogies to these other systems might threaten to 
blend them—leaving us unable, say, to tell whether “curb your dog” or “don’t 
wear white after Labor Day” are rules of law or not. Something has to keep law 
and custom apart, and maybe that something is the courts. 
In our society, law is marked by its involvement with formal proceedings 
and authoritative pronouncements, along with a vast and complex structure of 
powers, immunities, and officials. No one is arrested by the fashion police (yet), 
but law speaks with the sovereign’s voice and is backed by the use of force. 
That’s why Greenberg discounts analogies to “rules of practices (including 
organizations, games, and so on),” because “familiar practices, such as 
etiquette, . . . have no equivalent to legal officials, let alone to the acceptance by 
officials of a rule of recognition.”160 Even Blackstone thought the “customs or 
maxims” that “shall form a part of the common law” were distinguished by their 
being “known,” and their “validity . . . determined,” by “the judges in the several 
courts of justice.”161 Is what differentiates law, then, the fact that officials make 
it? 
As it turns out, legal and nonlegal norms are remarkably similar. Almost 
every important feature of legal norms—including secondary rules, reliance on 
officials, or the morally significant use of force—can also be found outside the 
law. What truly differentiates legal norms from social norms might just be what 
differentiates different kinds of social norms from each other: their use in 
particular fields and their application to particular problems. 
No less than legal systems, nonlegal groups often adopt secondary rules—
rules about rules—in addition to their ordinary rules of primary conduct. 
Informal clubs or student associations sometimes follow customary rules of 
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practice, and some of their rules incorporate other authorities by reference: for 
example, the traditional pride of place given to Robert’s Rules of Order.162 
Natural languages, too, can have these secondary rules. It might be that a 
customary rule of the French language authorizes the Académie française to 
define or exclude new words (like “le email”); recognizing the Académie’s 
authority would then be part of what’s required to be a competent French-
speaker. There’s little distance between the informal social recognition that 
“what Robert’s Rules prescribe is proper procedure,” or “what the Académie 
approves is proper French,” and a recognition by legal officials that “what the 
Queen-in-Parliament enacts is law.”163 
These kinds of authoritative resolutions are especially common in law, 
which gives legal disputes a kind of crispness that disputes over grammar or 
fashion usually lack. (How would a “grammar court,” hearing a “grammar suit,” 
even begin to weigh the expert testimony of disputing authorities?164) But 
treating that crispness as unique to law is largely a sleight-of-hand, because it 
presupposes a thoroughgoing consensus about other social rules, including those 
which specify the relevant legal sources. If our grammar or fashion norms were 
as determinate as all that, we’d have no trouble resolving grammar or fashion 
disputes. Even the technical, artificial languages used in computer 
programming—which might leave no room for doubt about proper syntax or 
interpretation—rest ultimately on a consensus within various programming 
communities about which features of the language are canonical, and which are 
idiosyncratic “forks” or departures from the norm.165 Law is no more or less 
subject to disagreement than anything else. And, indeed, when the sociolegal 
consensus breaks down—as happened during the Dorr Rebellion, when two rival 
governments claimed power in Rhode Island166—we might well feel more 
confident in our judgments of contemporary fashion than in many judgments of 
contemporary law. 
Reliance on officials is also very widespread, even in customary domains. 
Once we identify shared norms, we regularly task some persons or institutions 
with applying them. A teacher hired by the College Board to grade AP English 
essays is expected to ignore her own preferences or pet peeves and to grade the 
exams according to common standards. Even the unorganized group of friends 
who choose a referee for a pickup basketball game are empowering a neutral 
official, by means of a social rule, to render authoritative resolutions of disputes. 
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So while official constructions of law do carry an authority often lacking in 
private applications of social rules, this is at most a difference in degree and not 
in kind. Hart famously compared judges to the official scorers of games, who 
have authority to apply the rules and to make binding determinations.167 This in-
game authority entails that “the score is what the scorer says it is”; but it doesn’t 
eliminate every other rule, collapsing the game into one of “scorer’s 
discretion.”168 A player without such authority can still privately “assess the 
progress of the game,”169 using the same rules that the scorer would 
“find[] . . . established as a tradition and accepted as the standard for [his] 
conduct.”170 
In the same way, the fact that customary legal rules have to be applied by 
judges doesn’t entail that the judges get to make the rules. Instead, they might be 
expected to apply rules already known and established by custom. A customary 
legal rule might eventually fade away if it weren’t accepted by most of the 
judges, most of the time; but that doesn’t make the judges who use the rule its 
author,171 any more than a basketball referee is the author of the three-point line. 
(A $5 million award in Maine recently turned on the absence of an Oxford 
comma in the statute;172 certainly judges didn’t create that rule, even if they 
could decide whether or not to apply it.173) Richard Ekins points out that a court 
need have “no more authority than any other subject of the law to interpret” what 
the law requires; its job might simply be to resolve disputes, with interpretation 
only becoming relevant when the disputes turn on contested understandings of 
the law.174 The rest of the time, the court is engaging in essentially the same 
activity as the lawyer who renders opinions in her office,175 or the Monday-
morning referee who watches the replay and questions the call. 
Nor is it a significant distinction—for these purposes, at least—that legal 
norms are frequently controversial, comprehensive in scope, of great moral 
weight, or characterized by the use of force.176 Most of the time, there’s not much 
morally at stake in linguistic practice; people can talk however they want. But 
some language use might be highly controversial, as in the case of gender 
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pronouns or the singular “they.”177 Law’s broad field of application isn’t unique 
either; for example, virtually every human activity might fall within the domain 
of some field of etiquette. And other social norms can also give rise to urgent 
moral concerns: think of the code duello, or “honor killings,” or the bloody 
unwritten rules of Jim Crow.178 People have always used violence to impose and 
enforce social norms, whether or not those norms had the name of law. The fact 
that legal norms sometimes give the state a monopoly on violence may be a point 
in their favor, but it doesn’t make them fundamentally different from other sorts 
of social rules. 
That shouldn’t surprise us, because on the standard positivist picture, legal 
rules simply are social rules, or are indirectly derived therefrom.179 We can 
usually tell social rules apart without any kind of formal apparatus; 
understanding a custom means understanding what the custom is not. We can 
tell fashion from etiquette simply by knowing their respective domains, 
notwithstanding the occasional edge case where the same conduct breaches both 
(like wearing a long white dress to a wedding); and we can tell bad grammar 
from bad writing simply by knowing the conventions applicable to each. We’re 
already pretty good at distinguishing Shakespearean English from modern 
English, or kickball from dodgeball, or the ordinary rules of etiquette from the 
nonlegal conventions specific to law or politics (judicial robes, faithless electors, 
State of the Union addresses, pre-Roosevelt limits on presidential terms). 
Occasional edge cases notwithstanding, then, it needn’t be any more 
difficult as a theoretical matter to distinguish ordinary social rules from rules of 
law: say, to distinguish ordinary gossip from common law defamation, or 
aggressive driving from a moving violation. To delineate those differences, we 
might look to treatises or court decisions, but that doesn’t mean the judges or the 
treatise writers made them up. The custom in foro and the custom in pays are 
different customs, and we distinguish them the same way we distinguish all the 
others. 
That might sound a little hand-wavy, but it’s borne out by our ordinary 
experience. Divisions between normative systems aren’t always cut-and-dried, 
but they do real work, and they can do real work for law. Berman, for example, 
suggests that legal systems are marked out by their connections to politics, 
serving as “political communities’ normative Swiss-Army knives.”180 If so, 
they’d inherit all the messiness involved in distinguishing political communities 
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from many other overlapping social structures—including those defined by 
class, culture, profession, religion, region, or ethnicity. Yet the field of political 
science hasn’t collapsed for lack of borders, and neither has the law. People don’t 
need a crisp set of necessary and sufficient conditions to know a legal rule when 
they see it: the degree of legal obligation attached to a custom in foro may be 
something the custom itself tells us. 
3. The nature of unwritten law 
Whether unwritten rules are really rules of law might depend on what 
counts as law in the first place. If your theory grounds law in official action, as 
many positivist theories do, then you might insist (with Dickinson) that a custom 
has legal force “only when and so far as the courts have determined to accept it 
as such.”181 If courts get to choose which customs are legally binding, then they 
might be said to choose the law—making it hard to say that this law is found 
rather than made. 
But are those theories correct? Some claims about law, like that it’s always 
the command of a sovereign or a prediction of official action, are now thought 
far less persuasive than they seemed in Justice Brandeis’s day. And other claims, 
such as that only legal institutions can distinguish legal rules from nonlegal ones, 
remain unproven at best. 
Erie itself, citing Justice Holmes, relied on an Austinian command theory: 
law is the command of the sovereign, and it speaks with the sovereign’s voice. 
So a common law rule needs “some definite authority behind it,” such as a 
declaration of the sovereign’s court.182 Since Erie, though, Austin’s theory has 
come under withering scrutiny. As Brian Bix describes it, the theory is now 
“almost friendless, and is today probably best known from Hart’s use of it as a 
foil.”183 On Hart’s account, the custom comes first: the written rule is special 
only because an unwritten rule makes it so. To paraphrase an argument by Stefan 
Sciaraffa, a judge’s decree that a custom has legal force would still “be a dead 
letter absent a custom among the system’s legal officials of conforming” to the 
judge’s decrees.184 That custom continues to matter even after the decree issues, 
because whether the decree “is live or a dead letter comes in degrees.”185 
Indeed, in a regime in which the very existence, identity, and jurisdiction 
of the courts was determined by rules of customary law—say, that “there shall 
be four superior courts of record, the chancery, the king’s bench, the common 
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pleas, and the exchequer”186—it’d seem rather circular to base these rules’ legal 
force on their having been announced by the courts they constitute. The very idea 
of appellate precedent (with distinctions between holdings and dicta, binding and 
persuasive authority, and so on) itself trades on judges’ fidelity to unwritten 
rules, despite an awareness that their superior courts simply “can’t reverse 
everything.”187 In the end, we can’t do without customary rules.188 
Elsewhere Justice Holmes suggested a different theory, that law depends 
on official action because it’s just a prediction of how officials will act: “The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are 
what I mean by the law.”189 That theory is popular among cynics as well as 
practicing lawyers, who get paid to advise clients on what judges might do. But 
among legal experts, it’s also “nearly friendless,”190 with some authors denying 
that the realists ever really believed it.191 A judge consulting a law book isn’t 
trying to predict her own actions, any more than chess players merely predict 
that they’ll move bishops diagonally.192 For our purposes, moreover, the 
prediction theory proves too much, and thereby fails to say anything interesting 
about unwritten law in particular. We want to know whether courts might treat 
unwritten standards the way they treat statutes—or, conversely, whether 
unwritten law is necessarily judge-made in the way that some kinds of law are 
not. If law is always and everywhere a prediction about judges, then all these 
sources are evidence together, and there’s nothing any less law-like about an 
unwritten rule.193 (Nor is it clear why judges are the officials who matter; what 
your clients really want to predict is the behavior of policemen, judicial marshals, 
and the 101st Airborne. On the other hand, if we bring judges and statutes back 
into the picture—say, because marshals usually listen to judges, and judges 
usually listen to statutes—then it would also matter whether judges usually listen 
to customary law.) 
 
 186. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at *68. 
 187. See Heather K. Gerken, Judge Stories, 120 YALE L.J. 529, 530 (quoting Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt). 
 188. See generally John Gardner, Can There Be a Written Constitution?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES 
IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 162 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011). 
 189. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897). 
 190. Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514, 517 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); accord Fallon & Meltzer, 
supra note 4, at 1763 (“The fallacies of a ‘predictive theory’ of law, which Holmes is often taken to have 
asserted, are well known.”). 
 191. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, in 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 59, 60, 71 (2007) (arguing that the Realists “had nothing explicit to say about the 
concept of law”). But see Green, supra note 95, at 11–12 (arguing that some realists did believe this); 
cf. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 124–25 (Roland Gray ed., 2d 
ed. 1921) (arguing that “all the Law is judge-made law,” for “it is only words that the legislature utters; 
it is for the courts to say what those words mean”). 
 192. HART, supra note 37, at 147. 
 193. See Leslie Green, Introduction to HART, supra note 37, at xvii (“It would be like being told 
God doesn’t exist, only to find out that the interlocutor doesn’t believe in the existence of dogs either.”). 
556 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:527 
A third theory, suggested by Joseph Raz, is that courts are responsible for 
identifying customary legal rules because of the judiciary’s fundamental role in 
the legal system. On Raz’s account, a legal rule is “part of the system only if it 
is recognized by legal institutions”—in particular, by “primary law-applying” 
institutions like courts.194 Courts do have an enormous impact on legal practices, 
and law-applying institutions do need some way of separating legal norms from 
nonlegal ones when the occasion arises. But do they need an institutional 
decision to draw this line? Perhaps these institutions could instead respond to 
what’s already the case—to the fact that a particular custom might already be 
recognized as law, even before its first discussion by a court, just as a particular 
grammar rule is operative even before its first invocation by a grader of AP 
exams. Raz notes that there are some customs on which courts are already 
disposed to act,195 as to which the courts are “merely recognizing and enforcing” 
existing standards and not making their own.196 And courts are hardly the only 
law-appliers in town. If all sorts of officials and private citizens are routinely 
engaged in applying the law, and if they already consider particular customary 
rules to be an ordinary part of the law that they apply, then why must they wait 
for a court to speak first? A system in which the courts routinely enforce different 
rules than everyone else would certainly be unstable, just as a sporting event will 
be unstable if the scorer has gone rogue.197 But the practical need for a faithful 
scorer doesn’t mean that rules only go into effect once a scorer has applied them. 
To Hart, it seemed clear that courts might “apply custom, as they apply 
statute, as something which is already law and because it is law”; to exclude this 
possibility was “merely dogmatic.”198 If a society can recognize as law 
whatever’s written in a particular book, whatever’s “carved on some public 
monument,” and so on, it can also recognize as law whatever’s identified by a 
certain kind of customary practice.199And one of the things this customary law 
might do would be to incorporate other bodies of customary rules by reference. 
Some jurisdictions might have a local custom or usage of adopting the general 
common law—essentially, a reception statute without the statute200—while other 
jurisdictions might not.201 If adopted in this way, the general law would really be 
“law in [the] jurisdiction,” but “only because the jurisdiction’s officials or 
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inhabitants said so.”202 The situation would be much like that of the law of 
nations, which was commonly said to be to be part of the common law203—a part 
that the local jurisdiction couldn’t actually amend or change, though one it could 
always abrogate or choose not to apply.204 A system founded on social practice 
could thus incorporate rules external to its own society; these incorporated rules 
would be given sovereign authority, without needing a sovereign author. 
There may be good responses to this account, and reasons why custom, 
local or general, has to wait for the courts to be made law. But without having 
those reasons in hand, the burden of proof seems to rest with those who 
disagree—who claim that customary law can only be created by courts, and that 
it can’t be found by judges. 
C. Finding law in practice 
One last reason to believe that judges can find law is that they actually do 
it quite often. (As in the old saw about believing in infant baptism: “Hell yes, 
I’ve seen it done!”205) This Article doesn’t claim that any particular society has 
charged its judges only to find the law, and never to make it. But at least some 
legal norms have been found throughout history, a practice that still continues 
today. 
The common law is often identified with case law—that is, with judicial 
legislation structured by rules of stare decisis. But English law used unwritten 
rules for centuries before such doctrines took their modern form. In the early 
eighteenth century, Sir Matthew Hale described the traditional doctrine as 
treating judicial opinions as mere evidence of the law: 
It is true, the Decisions of Courts of Justice, tho’ by Virtue of the Laws 
of this Realm they do bind, as a Law between the Parties thereto, as to 
the particular Case in Question, ‘till revers’d by Error or Attaint, yet 
they do not make a Law properly so called, (for that only the King and 
Parliament can do); yet they have a great Weight and Authority in 
Expounding, Declaring, and Publishing what the Law of this Kingdom 
is, especially when such Decisions hold a Consonancy and Congruity 
with Resolutions and Decisions of former Times; and tho’ such 
Decisions are less than a Law, yet they are a greater Evidence thereof 
than the Opinion of any private Persons, as such, whatsoever.206 
Hale’s account was no pious fiction. “Legal historians widely agree,” 
Postema writes, “that before the eighteenth century there was no firm doctrine 
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of stare decisis in English common law.”207 In other words, “if historians are 
correct, English common law functioned well enough for over 500 years without 
the one thing that, according to current orthodoxy, held the practice together as 
a form of law.”208 
Instead, according to David Ibbetson, the English relied on customs in foro, 
customs not “of the English people as a whole but of the lawyers.”209 The 
customary law thus created was not “just judge-made: it was the product of the 
whole legal culture focused first on Westminster Hall and later on the Inns of 
Court, where lawyers lived, discussed, taught and learned together.”210 Even 
today, as Peter Tiersma notes, “a remarkable amount of orality has survived in 
the English common law.”211 
These English practices were carried across the pond. In the early 
nineteenth century, as Judge Fletcher famously described, federal and state 
courts managed “to develop a uniform body of law” on marine insurance, seeing 
themselves as “engaged in the joint endeavor of deciding cases under a general 
common law.”212 Justice Brandeis himself found it difficult to resist the practice; 
shortly after Erie, he decided a case in which “[m]ost of the issues . . . involve 
questions of common law and hence are within the scope of [Erie],” yet he saw 
no claim “that the local law is any different from the general law on the 
subject.”213 
In our own day, federal courts constrained by Erie frequently act as if 
they’re finding rules of unwritten law. This might happen in cases involving 
accretion and avulsion of littoral property;214 waiver on appeal;215 uncodified 
criminal defenses, such as duress or necessity;216 the doctrine that interest goes 
with the principal;217 and so on. Many rules of so-called federal common law 
are, in substance, just the old general-law doctrines in disguise. Caleb Nelson 
documents how courts applying common law concepts in federal statutes will 
look to general principles of torts or agency—“how most states do things,” as 
 
 207. Postema, supra note 13, at 589. 
 208. Id. 
 209. David Ibbetson, Custom in Medieval Law, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, 
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 151, 165 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James 
Bernard Murphy eds., 2007); see also Oran Doyle, Conventional Constitutional Law, 38 DUBLIN UNIV. 
L.J. 311, 315 (2015). 
 210. Ibbetson, supra note 209, at 165. 
 211. Tiersma, supra note 36, at 1188; see also Chaim Saiman, The Domain of Private Law: An 
Anglo vs. American Comparison 22–23 (Jan. 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) 
(describing the role of general law in the Commonwealth). 
 212. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 
The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (1984). 
 213. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 n.1 (1938) (Brandeis, J.). I am indebted 
to James Stern for this example. 
 214. See New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 784 (1998). 
 215. See Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 716–18 (2016). 
 216. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2006). 
 217. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162–63 (1980). 
2019] FINDING LAW 559 
opposed to what any one state has said.218 This looks a great deal like courts 
finding law rather than making it. 
Most importantly, federal courts are told to find law in the one place where 
we might expect the contrary: the decision of state-law issues under Erie. In 
George Rutherglen’s quip, Justice Holmes’s “predictive theory of law has been 
everywhere discredited as a theory of adjudication—except in its application to 
state law under the Erie doctrine.”219 Federal courts deciding state-law issues 
must perform the “Erie guess,” predicting how the issues might be decided in 
the state court of last resort.220 As Justice Holmes put it almost three decades 
before Erie, the “fiction” of Swift and of general common law “had to be 
abandoned” once everyone realized “that decisions of state courts of last resort 
make law for the State.”221 If court decisions make law, rather than find law, then 
federal courts have to apply the law made by those courts, and they should try to 
reach the same ruling that the state courts would reach. 
What’s strange, though, is that the Erie guess presumes that federal courts 
are indeed capable of finding law—so long as it’s the law of a state. When a 
federal court makes an Erie guess, it’s guessing what state courts would do by 
their own lights, not deciding what those courts should do. To Justice Holmes, a 
federal court has power “only to declare the law of the State,” based on existing 
sources, and “not an authority to make it” out of whole cloth.222 But if a federal 
court can do that, then presumably it’s also capable of declaring law of other 
sorts, without any “authority to make it”—of making guesses about how a given 
issue might be decided by courts throughout the United States (or the whole 
common-law world), based on the existing legal sources and according to 
prevailing views. That is, it could go about finding, and not making, the 
preexisting law.223 
II. 
MUST JUDGES MAKE LAW? 
Suppose that judges sometimes find law. Could that be all they do? Or do 
they sometimes need to make it instead? 
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This Article assumes, for argument’s sake, that the “right-answer thesis” is 
false: not every legal question has to have a uniquely correct right answer, and 
certainly not one that’s easy to find. When such questions arise, the legal system 
needs a way of settling them, like handing them over to a judge. If the system 
has rules of precedent, then that decision will be taken as a standard for the 
future—making new law, some would say, in order to fill the gap. If legal 
uncertainty will always be with us, the argument goes, then so will judicial 
lawmaking. 
Both courts and scholars have accordingly treated judge-made law as 
inevitable. The Supreme Court borrowed from Austin the view “that judges do 
in fact do something more than discover law; they make it interstitially by filling 
in with judicial interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic . . . terms that 
alone are but the empty crevices of the law.”224 Hart, too, concluded that in 
“legally unregulated cases” in which the law dictates “no decision either way,” 
a judge “must exercise his discretion and make law for the case”225—employing 
“law-creating powers”226 to choose “between the competing interests in the way 
which best satisfies us.”227 Some realists described this as a crucial “discovery 
about the way our courts work,” one that “helped to bring about the Erie 
decision—the realization that the judicial process is not a mechanical process of 
‘finding’ or ‘discovering’ an already existing law, but quite often the creative job 
of making new law.”228 Even Justice Scalia conceded that judges must make law, 
with the caveat that they should act as if they don’t: making law “as judges make 
it, which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, 
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”229 
Forbidding judges to make law is actually more plausible than it seems. 
Even when judges can’t help breaking new ground in their decisions, they’re still 
just making decisions; they don’t have to be making law. The legal force of their 
decisions rests on other doctrines in the legal system, and a decision can be 
legally influential, or even binding, without changing the law on which it’s 
based. A legal rule might be “the law of the case” or “the law of the circuit” 
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without being “the law”; it stands in for the actual law without supplanting or 
altering it. So a system might provide that the decisions of courts, even those of 
last resort, only establish stand-in obligations like these—leaving future judges 
and officials free to pursue the real law, and leaving that law to be found rather 
than made. 
Requiring judges to find the law is consistent with hiring fallible human 
beings to be judges. Plenty of people, including other officials and private 
parties, have to make decisions under legal uncertainty—sometimes facing 
precisely the same kinds of problems as the uncertain judge. We can expect them 
to follow the law, as a normative matter, at the same time that we expect them as 
an empirical matter to fail repeatedly in doing so. But what we expect of them 
still matters, and it makes a real difference to the law. 
A. Making decisions and making law 
The basic argument that decisions make law is rather simple. To Hart, if 
courts can “make authoritative determinations of the fact that a rule has been 
broken, these cannot avoid being taken as authoritative determinations of what 
the rules are.”230 If future courts have to decide similar cases in a similar way, 
then “these judgments will become a ‘source’ of law,”231 resembling “the 
exercise of delegated rule-making power by an administrative body.”232 
But not all legal systems treat precedent this way. Some civil law systems 
have treated it as persuasive authority only.233 Some past common law systems 
waited for a line of cases, not just a single decision, before declaring a matter 
settled.234 And even modern-day systems needn’t treat a court’s judgment as 
equivalent to a statute—something that, in Simpson’s phrase, “is both the only 
reason and a conclusive reason for saying that this is the law.”235 Precedent can 
make a powerful difference without having to make law, and a system can be 
committed to judicial precedent without being committed to judicial lawmaking. 
1. As-if law 
A court’s judgment can be “a ‘source’ of law” in more than one way. It 
might be res judicata, the law of the case, the law of the circuit, stare decisis, and 
so on. Each of these doctrines treats a prior judgment as having a certain amount 
of legal force in the future. But each does so by treating the judicial decision as 
if it were law, and not by substituting that decision for the underlying legal 
standards on which it’s based. 
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A judgment is certainly a source of law in a particular case. The final 
judgment in a civil action, unlike an interlocutory order, can only be corrected 
by limited means.236 An appellate judgment won’t be second-guessed on remand, 
under the mandate rule237—or even on a subsequent appeal, under the law-of-
the-case doctrine.238 But this doesn’t mean that either kind of judgment actually 
sets out the law. It only sets out what a court must assume is the law for purposes 
of a particular decision. The law-of-the-case rule has an exception if the prior 
decision is “clearly erroneous, and would work a substantial injustice”;239 that 
error can only be judged in light of the actual legal standards, not those 
determined by the prior court. 
A judgment can also be a source of law for the parties. It can bar certain 
claims or arguments through preclusion doctrines without affecting the legal 
system as a whole. When a plaintiff loses on a particular issue—say, whether the 
light was green or red, or whether the defendant had a duty of care—she might 
be collaterally estopped from challenging that determination in future cases, 
sometimes even as to third parties.240 But the decision doesn’t change the fact of 
the matter: the light was actually green or red, or the defendant did or didn’t owe 
a duty, no matter what the court said about it and no matter what future courts 
must assume. 
A judgment can be a source of law for other courts as well. The Fourth 
Circuit’s search-and-seizure holdings bind district courts in Maryland, but not in 
Delaware, even though the same Fourth Amendment applies in each state. The 
force of those holdings might vary by legal issue: the Federal Circuit applies its 
own law to patent issues, but “the law of the regional circuit” to others.241 In this 
context, no one would confuse “the law of the Fourth Circuit” with “the law”; 
otherwise it’d be impossible, say, for the Federal Circuit to read the same 
(nonpatent) statute according to the rival interpretations of different circuits in 
different cases. Judges of the Federal Circuit, like district judges in Maryland, 
are occasionally required to assume that Fourth Circuit precedent is correct—
just as they’re occasionally required to assume the irrelevance of a waived 
argument, the resolution of a precluded issue, or the truth of a well-pleaded 
complaint. They may have to say it, and even act on it; but they don’t have to 
believe it, and it doesn’t have to be right. 
The same theory can be applied to courts of last resort. As a matter of legal 
theory, there’s no reason why the holdings of a court like the Supreme Court of 
the United States must necessarily be taken to represent “the law,” as opposed to 
“the law of the Supreme Court,” binding on other courts within the reach of its 
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appellate jurisdiction. When the Court construes state law, for example, its 
decision isn’t always binding on the courts of that state. Even within the federal 
system, the Court acknowledges a distinction between the true law and its 
precedents every time it describes a past decision as “wrong the day it was 
decided.”242 
Societies have good reasons for occasionally forcing their courts to assume 
false things. Acting as if a certain proposition were law helps achieve a variety 
of social goals: it avoids relitigation, provides stability, and so on.243 But a legal 
practice of occasionally ignoring the real answers doesn’t suggest that there are 
no real answers, either as to facts or as to law—or that the answers the court gave 
somehow became the real ones, as opposed to our being required to act as if they 
were. (Indeed, we often refuse to apply issue preclusion to certain “unmixed 
questions of law,”244 precisely to avoid forever binding the parties to something 
other than the actual law.) 
So Justice Scalia was too hasty when he claimed that “the requirement that 
future courts adhere” to a decision thereby “causes that decision to be a legal 
rule.”245 Rules of precedent might make a past decision of obvious legal interest; 
they might sometimes require actors to treat the decision as if it were the law. 
But precedent alone doesn’t require “that the decisions of Courts constitute 
laws”—something that the Supreme Court, prior to Erie, thought would “hardly 
be contended.”246 
2. Distinguishing law from precedent 
For some, this distinction between precedent and law may seem gossamer-
thin. It’s one thing to say that precedent doesn’t displace law when we know 
what the law is. But if there is no law on a subject, or we really can’t tell what it 
is, how could it possibly matter whether the precedent makes “real” law or just 
a stand-in? Why even try to differentiate the two? 
Distinguishing “real” law from “as-if” law might seem quite difficult. Does 
an administrative agency make new law when it issues a regulation, changing 
people’s legal rights and obligations? Or is it merely issuing an instruction, with 
which some other legal rule (like the organic statute) requires as-if compliance? 
Nondelegation worries aside, either view seems fraught with dangers. On the one 
hand, if the agency makes new law, then it’s hard to deny that private parties 
 
 242. See Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 497, 498 (2018). 
 243. See KOZEL, supra note 26; cf. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, AS IF: IDEALIZATION AND 
IDEALS (2017) (noting the prevalence and importance of as-if thinking). 
 244. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 171 (1984); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2)(a). 
 245. Scalia, supra note 6, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 246. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
 
564 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:527 
make new law when they sign a contract,247 that senior partners make new law 
when they give reasonable ethics instructions to junior associates,248 or that flight 
attendants make new law when FAA regulations require passenger compliance 
with lighted signs and crewmember instructions.249 On the other hand, maybe 
none of these things are real lawmaking, as opposed to the exercise of a 
preexisting legal power, or some other action to which some other rule lends as-
if force. But how far up the chain does that argument go? Are we sure that 
Congress makes any laws, as opposed to producing mere pieces of paper that 
Article I requires us to respect? If we don’t want to go that far, are we sure where 
to place judicial decisions on the scale? 
In fact, we can distinguish judges from these other actors without needing 
a general theory of who makes law and how. The proper way to classify a judicial 
holding might depend on its goal: say, to conform to a preexisting set of legal 
entitlements (as determined by external standards), or alternatively to lay down 
new standards for the future. To put it another way, we might ask whether the 
holding has a “mind-to-world” or “world-to-mind” direction of fit.250 A private 
contract might be unwise, or even unlawful, but it usually won’t be incorrect: 
it’s not trying to match some legal norm already in the world, but rather to do 
something new. The same is true of a newly adopted rule of court:251 the new 
rule’s purpose might be to recodify an old one, and to that extent it might be 
correct or incorrect about what the old rule did—that is, in the same colloquial 
sense in which a new tax cut might be right or wrong about economics. But 
although either the tax cut or the rule of court might be the consequence of human 
error, and thus fail to achieve its intended purposes, neither can be wrong about 
what the current rule now is. By contrast, other judgments about law can quite 
easily be mistaken: say, a judicial marshal’s interpretation of a court order. In 
some legal systems, it might equally make sense to describe a court’s judgment 
in a given case as incorrect on the law, even if it turns out to have a variety of 
useful consequences for the future. As Nelson argues, “[a]ll modern lawyers 
would understand” a claim that “[t]he Constitution plainly establishes Rule X, 
but the Supreme Court has interpreted it to establish Rule Y instead,” even if “the 
Court is not going to overrule that interpretation.”252 So long as the court’s 
holding is supposed to comport with an external standard, it can make sense to 
describe that standard, and not the holding, as the law. 
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When people argue that judicial lawmaking is inevitable, they tend to focus 
on cases in which these external standards are absent (or at least really hard to 
find). But if we’re going to treat judges as necessarily having authority to make 
real law, they can’t have that authority only in the gaps where “law runs out,” 
for the simple reason that no one knows where those gaps are. Legal questions 
don’t come neatly separated into two piles, “obvious” and “obscure.” Even if the 
set of actually indeterminate cases were fixed over time, the set of cases we 
believe to be indeterminate is not. Sometimes we discover legal reasons we 
didn’t know of before: new evidence of constitutional or legislative history, 
important authorities that the parties forgot to mention in their briefs, and so 
on.253 At that point, a court might have legal reason to change its mind, wholly 
independent of any considerations of good public policy. In doing so, the court 
wouldn’t be repealing an enacted rule, so much as determining that its prior 
decision was wrong the day it was decided. Yet if a precedent truly makes law—
serving as “both the only reason and a conclusive reason for saying that this is 
the law”254—then the law the precedent has made is complete and self-sufficient; 
it’s hard to see why the new information should matter. 
Alternatively, if we imagine courts to be making law whenever the issues 
are actually indeterminate, and to be making mere precedent whenever a right 
answer actually exists, then we’ll regularly be in a state of ignorance as to 
whether any given precedential rule is really a rule of law or not. (Who knows 
what new evidence the future might bring?) Yet the entire point of treating 
precedent as law, on this gap-filling account, is to avoid the strangeness of 
drawing an important distinction between two things—law and precedent—that 
we can’t tell apart in practice. Limiting lawmaking to actually obscure cases does 
precisely the same thing, one level up. 
The problems caused by conflating law and precedent are particularly 
severe when dealing with other systems of law. Suppose that our choice-of-law 
doctrines require us to decide a particular case according to the law of Japan. The 
Supreme Court plainly has no power to “make” Japanese law, any more than it 
can “make” state law in an Erie guess. The conflicts rule may be part of our legal 
system, but the Japanese legal rule is not; as Green writes, American officials 
“can neither change it nor repeal it, and [the] best explanation for its existence 
and content makes no reference to [American] society or its political system.”255 
The actual law of Japan is determined by Japanese social practices, and the most 
the Court can do is to state the American system’s best guess of what Japanese 
law might currently be. If the Court missed out on some relevant aspect of 
Japanese social practice, the best explanation is simply that it misstated Japanese 
law, not that it made a new rule of American law relating to Japan (which might 
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be criticized for policy reasons, but not for legal error). Declaring that the 
Supreme Court must be making new law, or that American law can’t incorporate 
Japanese law by reference, would seem to be an inappropriate limitation on what 
sorts of law American social practice might support. 
Treating a court’s application of a legal standard as necessarily generating 
a new standard—e.g., maintaining that the Fourth Amendment really does 
require different things in Maryland and Delaware—would also create all kinds 
of jurisprudential headaches.256 For one thing, why would state judges in 
Maryland be allowed to disagree? For another, why would judges be the only 
ones with this authority? A district attorney’s decision to drop a set of cases 
might set an internal precedent for her office, but it needn’t change the elements 
of the charged offense. Claiming that the charging decision, by eliminating the 
threat of criminal punishment for certain conduct, necessarily alters “the law of 
the 14th Judicial District of North Carolina” ignores the fact that the same 
conduct in the same jurisdiction will still be treated as unlawful in myriad other 
ways (postconviction review, official impeachment standards, negligence per se 
in civil actions, and so on). Disaggregating these issues into an innumerable set 
of separate and independent legal questions—a “bundle of sticks,” some 
governed by the district attorney and some not—would assume away all of the 
systematic features that make the law a coherent system of norms.257 It would 
also bring on all the disadvantages of the predictive theory, as the rules of internal 
precedent in prosecutors’ offices are subject to disaggregation too. The only 
thing determining this defendant’s punishment would be whether this assistant 
D.A. is likely to bring a case—but of course the assistant D.A. isn’t trying to 
predict her own behavior. Precisely the same could be said of any attempt to treat 
an appellate decision as really establishing “the law of the Fourth Circuit,” as 
we’d still need to ask why the Fourth Circuit gets to make law across its entire 
jurisdiction in a way that the Fourth Amendment apparently can’t. 
Finally, even if we thought that the Fourth Circuit necessarily makes law 
for district judges, it’s not clear that its authority has to bind anyone else. A legal 
system has a certain unity to it: the sale of a car between private persons will 
bind the U.S. government, altering its powers with respect to Fourth Amendment 
searches (“effects”), Fifth Amendment takings (“property”), and so on. That kind 
of legal unity makes sense if we take precedents as stand-in law: everyone else 
can recognize, in a unified way, that the decisions of the Fourth Circuit create 
stand-in legal reasons for the district judges in Maryland while leaving the actual 
law intact. But it’s not necessarily true if we take precedents as statements of the 
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law in general. There’s a live and longstanding controversy between 
departmentalist views of the judicial power, in which a court’s judgment only 
determines the law for the parties or for lower courts,258 and judicial-supremacy 
views, in which a precedential holding is binding on everyone in the 
jurisdiction.259 If a holding states the law, then every legal actor is bound by it 
(even if only within the Fourth Circuit). But if executive officials, legislators, or 
state judges can adopt their own views,260 then the law-precedent distinction 
makes a real difference. At the very least, departmentalism appears to be a 
plausible option that a legal system could choose—meaning that it’s no less 
plausible for a legal system to distinguish sharply between precedent and law. 
There are plenty of reasons why a society might give appellate courts a 
certain influence over legal questions, without granting them any power to 
change the law. In a hierarchical court system, having lower courts follow higher 
courts might help reduce uncertainty, process cases quickly, and kick important 
questions upstairs—all without reverting to a system of “scorer’s discretion.”261 
Any doctrine of precedent that’s binding on courts will matter to parties who find 
themselves before courts; lawyers will tell their clients about the precedents, and 
clients will change their behavior accordingly.262 But so would the Holmesian 
‘bad man,’ who doesn’t care about legal rules anyway. Those who do care about 
legal rules can’t make a priori assumptions about the scope of judicial 
lawmaking; the force of precedent is itself something that has to be determined 
by law. 
B. Can judges help it? 
Judges are human beings, not mechanical rule-followers. It may be 
theoretically coherent to distinguish judicial decisions from the law on which 
they’re based, but does that distinction exist in real life? When judges are given 
only vague rules to follow, they can’t help but make choices of their own—many 
of which end up transforming the rules that were in place. So can judges truly be 
expected not to make law? 
The answer is “yes,” but it turns on what one means by “expect.” We 
generally expect people to obey the law, but we also create police departments 
and prisons on the assumption that many people won’t. For the same reasons, no 
one should be so foolish as to predict that judges will always get the law right, 
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or even that they’ll always try in good faith. But predictions aren’t the point. We 
can make good faith a norm for judges’ conduct, even if we know that they’ll 
often fall short. Put another way, we can expect more of judges than we expect 
from them.263 
Finding law sounds most unrealistic as an account of the process of judicial 
decision. Real judges in real cases don’t flip through their books until they find 
the answer, then stop. But that objection confuses legal reasoning with judicial 
psychology, or with the phenomenology of judicial decision-making. Real-life 
judges also don’t proceed in the manner of a standard judicial opinion: they don’t 
sit down and start by pondering subject-matter jurisdiction, then the facts and 
prior proceedings, then the standard of review, and so on. Judges might proceed 
by hunches or guesswork, subject to a thousand biases and nonlegal influences; 
but their opinions have to give legal arguments in favor of the judgment, subject 
to ordinary standards of legal justification. As Hart noted, the role of legal 
reasoning isn’t found in the “methods of discovery,” but rather in the “standards 
of appraisal” that judges “respect in justifying decisions, however reached.”264 
As in Green’s example of the person who gets dressed in the morning without 
consciously adverting to social norms, the judge’s “[r]ule-following behavior 
is . . . displayed ex post actu, when rules are produced in justifications, used in 
communicating decisions to others, and [in] explaining what was done 
or . . . defending it against criticism, actual or anticipated.”265 
So the fact that judges, especially in unclear cases, don’t always feel like 
they’re “finding” law doesn’t mean that they’re making law instead. Hard cases 
often involve not a shortage of legal reasons, but a surplus; the cases are hard 
because too many legal reasons are in play at the same time. Confronted by all 
of these at once, uncertain judges aren’t forced into the position of choosing the 
best rule in the abstract, but of deciding how this menagerie of legal instructions 
is best satisfied on these facts. To Hart, “when the explicit law is silent, judges 
do not just push away their law books and start to legislate without further 
guidance from the law”; instead, courts proceed “by analogy,” accounting for the 
decision “in accordance with principles or underpinning reasons recognized as 
already having a footing in the existing law.”266 This process helps explain why 
such terms as “‘choice’, ‘discretion’, and ‘judicial legislation’ fail to do justice 
to the phenomenology of considered decision,” including “its felt involuntary or 
even inevitable character.”267 
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This process also ought to make us suspicious of the idea that the judge, in 
making a hard decision, is forced into the position of making new law. When a 
court addresses a legal standard to a particular set of facts, we usually call that 
activity “applying” law, not “making” it. Judges who disagree about the proper 
decision in a particular case—say, whether the plaintiff’s fear was 
“reasonable”—are disagreeing about the law’s proper application, and not 
necessarily about its content. We can all agree on what “reasonable” means 
without agreeing, in a particular case, on how the reasons come out.268 Some 
applications of the rule might be less persuasive than others, but so what? 
“[T]here is a great deal of ruin in a nation,”269 and a great deal of legal error in a 
nation’s courts; still, we generally manage to get by. 
After all, judges are hardly the only ones who have to make hard legal 
decisions. Prosecutors, policemen, and private citizens do so routinely. We 
regularly speak of juries as “finding facts,” even in contexts where the truth is 
somewhat in the eye of the beholder (whether the plaintiff’s work environment 
was truly hostile, the pain-and-suffering damages truly adequate, and so on). 
Relatively few people would call this a “childish fiction”; so why should it be 
odd to speak of judges in similar circumstances as “finding law”? Juries also 
make complex and largely unreviewable decisions in murky cases, but saying 
that the jury “makes facts” would sound paranoid or bizarre. And if a jury did 
exercise active choice over the facts—say, by flipping a coin or favoring a 
sympathetic party—it’d plainly be acting ultra vires. A court faced with a 
similarly hard question might come to a satisfying answer or an unsatisfying one, 
but the mere fact that it’s acting under uncertainty doesn’t mean that it’s “making 
law.” 
Unlike juries, of course, judges are supposed to explain their reasoning. But 
even in uncertain cases, they can do so while attempting to adhere to the existing 
standards. Berman distinguishes two categories of judicial doctrine: (1) the 
“operative propositions” that the relevant sources of law actually establish, and 
(2) the judge-created “decision rules”—the menagerie of tiers of scrutiny, n-
factor tests, and so on—which “direct courts how to decide whether [an] 
operative proposition is satisfied.”270 Even without a power to lay down new 
rules, a court might certainly come up with such n-factor tests on its own, as a 
way of formalizing its thought process in answering difficult questions—the way 
someone having trouble choosing a house might draw up a list of relevant 
factors, like “move-in ready” or “easy commute.” Future courts might then adopt 
the same list of factors as a proxy for the underlying legal considerations. 
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Perhaps, in the fullness of time, the customary law might change, and adhering 
to the list might itself become a customary rule.271 But none of this suggests any 
judicial power to alter the operative propositions, or to transform their legal 
requirements at will. As things currently stand, the proxy is not “a conclusive 
reason for saying that this is the law”;272 whatever its policy merits, it might still 
be a bad proxy, one that fails to track the operative propositions. 
This understanding of decision rules isn’t just a word game: it rules out 
otherwise-attractive judicial tactics and common attempts at evasion. Say that 
the most accurate standard would involve seven factors, but it’s much easier for 
district courts to administer a standard that has only three. A court with authority 
to make new law could simply abrogate the old test and lay down a simpler one. 
But a court without that authority can’t sacrifice the best legal standard for easy 
administration, any more than it can introduce administrability concerns or cost-
benefit analysis into a statute that ignores them.273 Doing so is equivalent to 
saying that there should have been a different legal rule, one responsive to fewer 
or more specific considerations than it was. The fact that judges frequently do 
rely on judicially authored n-factor tests doesn’t show that they’re making new 
law; what matters is how the tests are constructed, used, and understood. 
The United States might have a legal system in which judges are allowed 
to impose new legal standards, or it might not. Again, this Article doesn’t seek 
to describe our existing institutions, or even to suggest which choice is a better 
idea, all things considered. Its goal is merely to show that a world in which judges 
are charged to find the law, and not to make it, is hardly a strange hypothetical. 
It might be a world suspiciously resembling our own. 
III. 
ERIE AND FINDING LAW 
If law can be found, and not just made, what are we to make of Erie? No 
other decision has so exalted a place in American legal scholarship—regarded 
as “a sea change in how judges view law,”274 or even “a change in the nature of 
law itself.”275 Before Erie, judges were said to be “the living oracles of a 
preexisting natural law”; afterward, they apparently became “lawmakers in a 
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relativistic legal world,”276 in which “the common law was nothing more than 
[their] decisions.”277 Yet among many legal philosophers, Erie’s Austinian legal 
theory is nowadays thought to be wrong—obviously, laughably, “friendless[ly]” 
wrong.278 So if Erie was wrong about the nature of law, then what else was it 
wrong about? 
The answer may well be: nearly everything.279 What’s become known as 
the “Erie doctrine” is founded on a mistake. Though Erie’s flawed jurisprudence 
might be distinguished from its doctrinal legacy, the structure of the American 
legal system means that the two will always be intimately linked. On the state 
level, by denying that courts could find law, Erie undermined the states’ efforts 
to incorporate separate bodies of general law as their own. And on the federal 
level, Erie helped to birth an entirely ahistorical category of “federal common 
law,” which federal courts are encouraged to make rather than find. The result 
was a wholesale revision of numerous areas of doctrine, based largely on an error 
about legal theory. Whether one praises or assails the decision as a matter of 
policy,280 as an intellectual matter Erie was worse than a crime—it was a blunder. 
A. Legal theory and legal practice 
Had circumstances been otherwise, Erie’s errors might have been confined 
to the abstract and theoretical realm. According to Jack Goldsmith and Steven 
Walt, Erie didn’t need Austin anyway; a “general theory about the nature of law” 
should have “no implications for the allocation of authority between the state and 
federal governments.”281 It’s true that general theories don’t always have to 
affect concrete doctrine. But whether they do depends in part on what the 
doctrine says. In the particular circumstances of American federalism, Erie’s 
theory made an enormous doctrinal difference. 
Goldsmith and Walt’s contrary argument is straightforward. At its core, 
Erie was a case about who defers to whom for what; it held that federal courts 
must defer to a state court’s understanding of general law rather than applying 
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that law for themselves. A view that judges make or find law could be compatible 
with either Erie or its opposite. Maybe state judges make state unwritten law, 
which federal judges must then apply; or maybe federal judges make national 
unwritten law, which state judges must then apply. On the other hand, maybe 
judges can find law instead, in which case we’d still need to decide whether 
either a federal or a state court should defer to what the other finds.282 As Walt 
puts it, either theory of judicial authority is consistent with either approach to 
judicial federalism, so positivism is at most a “superfluous premise in Erie’s 
rationale and its constitutional holding”283: general jurisprudence “says nothing 
about which roles are appropriate for federal courts,” and Erie can’t rest on 
whether judges make law or find it.284 
The problem with Goldsmith and Walt’s argument isn’t that it’s wrong, but 
that it’s too general. By looking only to which legal regimes are possible, it 
ignores the question of whether any existing constitutional rules, federal or state, 
do rest Erie’s holding on a particular legal theory. 
Sometimes the details of a legal system force us to deal in high theory. If a 
case should turn on the law of postwar Germany—say, involving retroactive civil 
liability for wartime acts—we might have to decide, in court, whether horrific 
Nazi laws were really laws at all.285 Usually that kind of question is reserved for 
legal philosophers.286 But when judges have to assess foreign law, the Federal 
Rules leave them to their own devices, telling them to consider “any relevant 
material or source.”287 So an American judge might have to decide the postwar 
status of Nazi law under the right theory of jurisprudence, whatever that is. That 
may be unfortunate, but it’s also their job; judges regularly decide whether a 
given chemical is really a carcinogen, or a given piece of evidence is really 
probative, so why not whether a given norm is really law?288 
There’s good reason to think that this is what happened in Erie: a garden-
variety legal question happened to turn on a deep question of jurisprudence. To 
determine if Tompkins had trespassed on the railroad’s right-of-way,289 Justice 
Brandeis had to determine the content of Pennsylvania law—and, if 
Pennsylvania had incorporated the general common law by reference, whether 
recent state-court decisions had displaced that law, or whether they merely 
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served as evidence thereof. Brandeis reasoned that “the law to be applied” was 
in either case “the law of the State,” and that this law might just as well be 
“declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision”; the 
choice between them was “not a matter of federal concern.”290 Yet if the choice 
were really up to the state, some states might not have wanted their high courts 
to announce the law. Maybe their legal systems still treated state judicial 
decisions as evidence of state law, and not as law themselves.291 Whether that 
choice is a coherent one, deserving of the federal courts’ respect, depends at least 
in part on whether courts are capable of finding law. If not, then a federal court 
charged by the Rules of Decision Act to apply “[t]he laws of the several 
States”292 is obliged to treat state decisions as making law rather than finding it, 
even if the state courts pretend otherwise. In a system with a particular approach 
to judicial federalism, these theoretical questions make a real difference. 
B. Erie and state common law 
As it happens, Erie’s theoretical error may have led it to take a seriously 
incorrect view of states’ unwritten law. On some historical accounts, the early 
American states inherited a tradition in which courts were charged to find law 
rather than make it.293 Whether by reception statute294 or by local custom,295 they 
had adopted the general common law as their own, instructing state officials and 
state courts to follow a legal tradition extending beyond their own borders.296 
Swift v. Tyson expected the federal courts to follow this cross-reference 
faithfully, except where “local statutes or local usages” otherwise prescribed: so 
long as the state claimed to be adhering to the general rule, the federal courts 
would adhere to it too.297 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, federal courts 
began to act more aggressively in enforcing general law, even when state courts 
had openly recognized local customs or usages authorizing departures from the 
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general rule.298 But Erie hardly devoted itself to investigating this history or 
enforcing the limits of Swift. Instead, it insisted that the states had adopted 
precisely the same views toward general law as happened to be held by Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis. 
As Michael Steven Green described in “Erie’s Suppressed Premise”299—
an article that others might have titled “One More Reason Why Erie is Wrong”—
the Erie Court declined to investigate any specific state legal systems to see if 
their courts were empowered to make law. Instead, Justice Brandeis simply 
assumed that finding general law was impossible, so the courts must be making 
it instead. (The “fallacy” of a “transcendental body of law,” and so on.300) The 
underlying theory was provided by Justice Holmes in the Taxicab Case:301 if a 
state constitution chooses to delegate legislative powers to the state courts, 
providing that “the decisions of the highest Court should establish the law,” then 
the federal Constitution shouldn’t interfere.302 And, Holmes assumed, this is the 
right way to read any state constitution with a court in it: “[W]hen the 
constitution of a State establishes a Supreme Court it by implication does make 
that declaration as clearly as if it had said it in express words.”303 
This is an extraordinary claim, especially when one remembers that many 
state constitutions—including, say, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780—
were enacted well before the modern acceptance of judge-made law.304 Why 
would Holmes assume that every state constitution must be read this way? 
Because, he wrote, each state supreme court necessarily “says with an authority 
that no one denies, . . . that thus the law is and shall be. Whether it be said to 
make or to declare the law, it deals with the law of the State with equal authority 
however its function may be described.”305 
If judges can find the law instead of making it, this last sentence is plainly 
false. A court charged only to find state law might occasionally be mistaken, but 
its decision and the law are different things. Except as the decision is used by 
lower courts or similar institutions, or as a practical guide for the parties, its 
authority is limited to its correctness. By contrast, if a state court necessarily 
makes state law, then it attains Bishop Hoadly’s “absolute Authority to 
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interpret,”306 and state law becomes something that it can’t be wrong about: 
whatever it decides is the law. (To paraphrase President Nixon, when a state 
supreme court does it, that means it is not illegal.) These two authorities are 
nothing alike. 
If Holmes was wrong to confuse the two—and this Article argues that he 
was—then the whole logic unravels. The mere existence of a court system isn’t 
enough to infer a delegation of lawmaking authority to state courts. And without 
a delegation of lawmaking authority to state courts, the federal courts have no 
clear obligation, whether under the Constitution or the Rules of Decision Act,307 
to defer to them on what the state itself considers to be matters of general law. 
One might try to resuscitate Erie with something like the following 
argument. When applying Vermont law, federal courts usually assume that 
Vermont’s courts know what their law is.308 Federal courts will even defer to 
state-court constructions of Vermont statutes,309 although the state courts don’t 
get to “make” statute law (and although Vermont’s other branches of government 
might, as an internal matter, assert a departmentalist independence from the state 
judiciary). So why shouldn’t federal courts defer to state-court constructions of 
unwritten law too, regardless of whether Vermont’s courts are considered, as an 
internal matter, to make or find the law?310 After all, the Vermont Supreme Court 
usually won’t tell anyone not to defer to it, as the deference question rarely arises 
at home.311 So the federal courts’ obligation to follow state law,312 and “the 
necessity that some court must have final authority to settle the meaning of state 
law,”313 suggest that whatever the Vermont Supreme Court says, goes. 
This argument might be challenged on its premises: perhaps state statutory-
construction decisions weren’t always taken as conclusive—at least not until “a 
series of decisions” could “settle the rule” and make it “the settled law of the 
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state.”314 But the real problem with the argument is that it assumes its conclusion, 
namely that the state makes no real distinction between local and general law. 
Suppose that Vermont really wants to incorporate some other rules by reference; 
say, that a statute discussing “the law of the place of contracting” makes a case 
turn on the laws of Japan.315 Maybe Vermont’s courts are owed deference as to 
what the statute means—as if it had really said “law*” or “contracting*,” with 
the asterisks denoting implicit limitations to be named later. But if Vermont’s 
courts read the words the same way everyone else does, then there’s no issue of 
local law to be discussed. Vermont’s courts would enjoy deference on whether 
Vermont really cross-references the law of Japan, but not necessarily on what 
the laws of Japan actually are—a question that other courts can investigate on 
their own, and as to which the “state tribunals are called upon to perform the like 
functions as ourselves.”316 
It’s certainly possible for states to incorporate other rules by reference—
and even to do so blindly, making no attempt to review the details of what’s 
incorporated.317 And they might incorporate, not only the laws of another 
jurisdiction, but other bodies of rules as well—like the American Law Institute’s 
Restatements,318 or even a past edition of Robert’s Rules of Order.319 Had 
Vermont reprinted the text of Robert’s Rules in its session laws, maybe we’d 
believe its courts’ claim to be construing the idiosyncratic language of a local 
statute. Or if its courts claim to be relying on some procedural usage specific to 
Vermont, modifying the otherwise-applicable provisions of Robert’s Rules, 
maybe we’d have to believe them—for “it is a principle, that the general common 
law may be, and in many instances is, controlled by special custom.”320 But if 
the statute book merely says “Robert’s Rules of Order” with no claim of any 
asterisk, then garden-variety disputes about some provision buried in Robert’s 
Rules don’t obviously turn on any questions of local law. 
At the very least, this is a plausible way for a state to organize its legal 
system. As a matter of historical fact, we know that states have sometimes treated 
portions of their law as true incorporations-by-reference in this way, seeking to 
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achieve uniformity across borders rather than within them.321 That makes it hard 
to argue that definitive settlement of general-law questions by a single state court 
is truly a “necessity”322—or that federal courts must, as Holmes and Brandeis 
suggested, treat state court decisions as conclusive on every question that arises 
from the state’s law. 
Today, eight decades on, Justice Holmes’s vision of judge-made law is 
widely echoed. Perhaps our state constitutions now do confer, or have been 
authoritatively construed to confer, lawmaking powers on state courts.323 This 
Article takes no position on that question, which is ultimately one of empirics 
rather than theory. Still, that possibility leaves Erie on shaky ground. Some states 
might dissent from the modern view (Green suggests Georgia);324 others might 
do so in particular areas (say, the interpretation of the Uniform Commercial 
Code), seeking to conform their legal rules to those of a broader tradition. In 
either case, simply citing state court decisions as the sole source of authority—
as the “Erie doctrine” is thought to require—might well get the state’s law 
wrong. If Erie was wrong on the theory, then it’s probably just wrong about state 
law. 
C. Erie and “federal common law” 
When it comes to federal law, the situation is even worse. The federal 
judicial power was parceled out in 1788, long before Justice Holmes could get 
his mitts on it. If federal courts back then were supposed to find the law—
especially in areas where the states were incompetent to legislate—then Erie’s 
preference for judge-made law shouldn’t stand in the way. Recognizing the 
theoretical flaws in the Erie doctrine might well mean tossing its whole invented 
edifice of “federal common law,” in favor of federal courts finding actual 
common law rules.325 
On the day it decided Erie, the Court also announced that an interstate water 
dispute involved questions “of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither the 
statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.”326 Today, “federal 
common law” is said to preempt contrary state law,327 to authorize federal-
question jurisdiction,328 and to allow for judicial legislation in the pursuit of 
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“sound policy.”329 All of this may turn out to be a modern invention,330 and one 
in deep tension with the Constitution’s actual text.331 But if so, the invention was 
foreordained by Erie’s insistence that law always has to be made by somebody—
and if not by Congress or by a state, then why not by the federal courts? 
One alternative, of course, is that federal courts might sometimes find law 
instead. When a case arises in which no state’s law controls, and to which no 
federal statute or treaty provides an answer, the federal courts might be required 
to apply preexisting sources of law that the Constitution left intact: in the Court’s 
words, to look to “known and settled principles of national and municipal 
jurisprudence,”332 such as “the common law,” “the law of equity,” or “the law of 
nations.”333 The United States is a common law jurisdiction, whose courts hear 
cases “in Law and Equity,” or of “admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”334 In 
Judge Fletcher’s famous formulation, the general common law—together with 
the rules of equity and admiralty—might be law “for the United States,” though 
“not of the United States”;335 law appropriate for use when necessary by federal 
courts, albeit without the preemptive status of “federal law.” Whenever the 
Constitution vests judicial power in the federal courts but leaves them without a 
rule of decision, this kind of law might still remain available for courts to apply. 
So the fact that courts can find law might entail that, under our system, they must 
do so—at least in particular enclaves such as admiralty,336 federal procedure,337 
or customary international law.338 
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Again, this Article focuses on what’s possible, and not what the American 
legal system (or any other system) actually requires. Whether Article III 
conferred a lawmaking power two centuries ago, or whether that power has 
somehow been wrested from Congress over time, are questions beyond this 
Article’s scope. But once we admit that finding law is a real possibility, we may 
well have to change our attitude toward the courts’ existing practice. As noted 
above, federal courts rarely use their oft-proclaimed power to shape new rules of 
federal common law; typically, they “adopt” the rules that were already in 
place.339 Yet they also feel competent to revise those rules when it strikes them 
as necessary.340 Whether the federal courts possess such a power may well 
depend on whether our legal system really authorizes them to make law, or 
whether it expects them merely to find it. 
CONCLUSION 
Accepting that judges can find unwritten law does more than correct a 
jurisprudential or historical error. Like its antithesis in Erie, it has the power to 
transform modern attitudes toward law. 
Almost a century later, it’s instructive to go back and see what Holmes 
actually envisioned for judicial legislation. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, a 
page away from his famous line about the “brooding omnipresence,” one finds 
the following: 
A common-law judge could not say “I think the doctrine of 
consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my 
court.” No more could a judge exercising the limited jurisdiction of 
admiralty, say, “I think well of the common-law rules of master and 
servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc.”341 
Holmes’s restraint here is surprising. For this is precisely how many judges, 
especially state judges, view their role today—as having been hired to examine 
common law rules and then to retain them or toss them aside. As New York’s 
Chief Judge Judith Kaye wrote in 1995, “Time and again, state courts have 
openly and explicitly balanced considerations of social welfare and have 
fashioned new causes of action where common sense justice required”—though 
wisely tempered by the need to “exercise that responsibility with care.”342 At its 
extreme, this picture presents each state judge as a swashbuckling Lord 
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Mansfield, bravely reforming the law of the land (with due consideration and 
humility, of course). 
This model is not without its advantages; there are reasons why Mansfield 
is still remembered today. But there are also drawbacks: limiting democracy, 
frustrating expectations, presenting legislators with a moving target, and 
depriving them of their ordinary ability—so crucial to striking bargains on other 
issues—to choose to leave well enough alone. 
As the model of finding law has receded, drawbacks like these have been 
shunted aside. After all, one reason why judges adopt the swashbuckling role is 
a belief that there’s no real alternative, that this is just what a common law judge 
does. As Chief Judge Kaye put it, “[f]or state judges, schooled in the common 
law, to refuse to make the necessary policy choices when properly called upon 
to do so would result in a rigidity and paralysis that the common-law process 
was meant to prevent.”343 Any residual “anxiety about ‘legislating from the 
bench,’”344 or worries that certain changes might be “best left to the 
Legislature,”345 are dismissed as naïveté or weakness of will—to be rebutted 
with the “inevitability” of gap filling, or the discovery that “all judges are 
activists.”346 In other words, it’s much easier to breeze past the ordinary critiques 
of judicial lawmaking if the alternative is philosophically defunct. 
This conceptual error also leads to revisionist readings of the history. Larry 
Kramer, for example, has explained how eighteenth-century common lawyers 
approached their subject very differently than many lawyers do today.347 But if 
“judge-made law is unavoidable,” as he argues, “simply because there is no clear 
line between ‘making’ and ‘applying’ law,”348 then it was just as unavoidable in 
the past. This leads to a sort of historical sleight-of-hand, with evidence of past 
courts’ finding law trotted out to support modern courts’ making it. Kramer 
argues that no one should “object[] when state courts take the initiative in 
fashioning common law,”349 for this practice—the modern practice, mind—
necessarily “was, is, and always has been allowed in all these states.”350 And in 
the federal courts too; for if making law is just what courts do, then Article III 
must necessarily confer a “traditional judicial power to make common law.”351 
Thus the Supreme Court’s famous, and famously self-serving, complaint that 
“the judicial hand would stiffen in mortmain if it had no part in the work of 
creation.”352 
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This change in attitude toward the common law seems to be rooted in a 
giant intellectual mistake. According to Kramer, the removal of limitations on 
judicial lawmaking “results not from doctrinal changes, but from changes in our 
beliefs about the nature of law and the lawmaking process.”353 It’s only because 
“[w]e have come to see that even the fundamental principles of the common law 
were ‘made’ by judges” that “the ‘natural’ limits of pre-modern common law 
disappear, and the potential for making common law becomes as broad as we are 
willing to let judges go.”354 Surely the judicial process could have used some 
demystification; surely the history of the common law, under Lord Mansfield as 
well as others, is replete with examples of judges playing fast and loose with 
unwritten law. But the real motive force here seems to be a simple error about 
the nature of law: that it’s a “fallacy” or “illusion” to suppose “that there is this 
outside thing to be found.”355 And such errors, once made, don’t restrict 
themselves to unwritten law: cavalier judicial attitudes toward the common law 
have seeped into statutory and constitutional arguments as well.356 
Again, nothing in this Article addresses the actual norms of actual legal 
systems—whether in Blackstone’s England, New York State, or the United 
States as a whole. Maybe today’s legal norms really do empower judges, federal 
or state, to trade in their black robes for superheroes’ capes, or to play “junior-
varsity Congress”357 with unwritten law. But in light of Holmes’s own reticence, 
it’s important to remember that this is not the only possible approach; that history 
and legal theory do offer alternatives; that different polities can choose, through 
their own constitutional systems, the powers they want their judges to enjoy. To 
make this choice, we need to restore, at least at the level of possibility, the 
consensus that such a choice exists. Unwritten law can be found, as well as made; 
the brooding omnipresence broods on. 
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